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Introduction 
On December 24, 2014, Officer Daniel Johnson of the Bishop Paiute 
Tribal Police Department1 received a call from a tribal member that the 
man’s ex-wife was causing a disturbance at his home.2 Officer Johnson 
knew the suspect well; he had responded to eight calls involving her in the 
past nine months.3 Officer Johnson drove to the man’s home, which was 
located within the Bishop Paiute reservation. While en route, he requested 
assistance from the sheriff in nearby Inyo County.4 Officer Johnson did so 
for one reason: the suspect was not Indian.5 This mattered because Indian 
tribes cannot prosecute non-Indians in their courts.6  
Officer Johnson approached the suspect and directed her to leave 
because tribal and state protective orders prohibited her from visiting the 
home.7 She refused. Officer Johnson then tried to arrest the suspect for 
violating her protective orders, as well as tribal trespass and nuisance 
ordinances.8 When she resisted, he deployed his taser.9 Minutes later, a 
sheriff arrived and helped Officer Johnson handcuff the suspect.10 
Ultimately, she was released after her ex-husband expressed that he did not 
want to press charges.11 A mine-run domestic disturbance, the event ended 
unremarkably.  
                                                                                                                 
 1. The Bishop Paiute Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe. See Indian Entities 
Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, 83 Fed. Reg. 4235, 4236 (Jan. 30, 2018). Located in the Eastern Sierra Nevada 
Mountains, it is the fifth largest tribe in California with approximately 2000 enrolled 
members. About the Bishop Paiute Tribe, BISHOP PAIUTE TRIBE, http://www. 
bishoppaiutetribe.com/about-us.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2019). Although the tribe has no 
criminal code, it has established a civil law system, including nuisance, trespass, and public 
safety ordinances. See Tribal Ordinances, BISHOP PAIUTE TRIBE, http://www. 
bishoppaiutetribe.com/tribal-ordinances.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).  
 2. Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., No. 1:15–cv–00367–DAD–JLT, 2018 WL 
347797, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2018). 
 3. Complaint at 22, Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., No. 1:15–cv–00367–DAD–JLT 
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Bishop Paiute Tribe Complaint].  
 4. Bishop Paiute Tribe, 2018 WL 347797, at *1. 
 5. See id. A note on terminology: This Note uses the terms “Indian,” “Native,” and 
“Native American” interchangeably to refer to the indigenous peoples of the United States.  
 6. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). 
 7. Bishop Paiute Tribe, 2018 WL 347797, at *1. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at *2.  
 11. Id.  
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What happened next, however, is extraordinary.12 Two weeks later, the 
Inyo County District Attorney charged Officer Johnson with false 
imprisonment, impersonating a public officer, assault with a stun-gun, and 
battery.13 To add insult to injury, Inyo County sent a letter to the Tribe 
ordering its police to “cease and desist all law enforcement of California 
statutes.”14 The County asserted that tribal police “do NOT have legal 
authority, notwithstanding Bishop Paiute Tribal authority, to enforce any 
state or federal law within or outside tribal property.”15 The letter 
threatened additional prosecutions if tribal police did not comply with the 
order.16 
In response, the Tribe sued Inyo County’s sheriff and district attorney in 
federal court to enjoin the prosecution of Officer Johnson.17 The Tribe also 
sought declaratory relief, asking the court to rule that the prosecution of 
Officer Johnson “violates federal common law” and that the Tribe’s police 
“have authority on its Reservation to stop, restrain, [and] investigate 
violations of tribal, state, and federal law” committed by non-Indians.18 The 
case settled in May 2019,19 after the Tribe’s complaint survived multiple 
rounds of motions to dismiss, one of which involved a trip to the Ninth 
Circuit.20  
                                                                                                                 
 12. Disputes between tribes and local governments over tribal police powers are nothing 
new. See, e.g., Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, 388 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2004). But 
the criminal prosecution of a tribal police officer is. See Press Release, Bishop Tribal 
Council, Bishop Paiute Tribe Supports Tribal Police Officer (Feb. 17, 2015), 
http://www.bishoppaiutetribe.com/press-releases.html#feb17 (denouncing the prosecution of 
Officer Johnson as “unprecedented”). 
 13. Bishop Paiute Tribe, 2018 WL 347797, at *2. 
 14. Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., 863 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 1149–50.  
 17. Bishop Paiute Tribe Complaint, supra note 3, at 9–11, 46.  
 18. Id. at 44–45. 
 19. Minutes, Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., No. 1:15-cv-00367 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 
2019), ECF No. 93. 
 20. The case’s winding procedural history underscores the complexity of the underlying 
legal issues. The district court sua sponte dismissed the Tribe’s complaint on the ground that 
it failed to plausibly allege a justiciable case or controversy. Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo 
Cty., No. 1:15–CV–00367-GEB-JLT, 2015 WL 4203986 at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 13, 2015). 
The Tribe appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling the Tribe’s claims presented a 
federal question and were justiciable because the Tribe’s interest in exercising its sovereign 
authority to detain non-Indians was impinged by the County’s prosecution of Officer 
Johnson. See Bishop Paiute Tribe, 863 F.3d at 1151–55. On remand, the County moved to 
dismiss the Tribe’s claims, but the district court rejected this challenge. Bishop Paiute Tribe 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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A county prosecuting a tribal police officer for doing his job is a 
foreseeable consequence of the confusion surrounding law enforcement in 
Indian Country. Described by Indian law scholars as a “maze,”21 “web,”22 
and “crazy quilt,”23 the current scheme of criminal jurisdiction scatters the 
prosecutorial authority typically reposed in a single sovereign among 
three—tribes, states, and the federal government.24 Supreme Court case law 
and federal statutes provide some guidance, but “grey areas loom larger.”25 
The authority of tribal police to investigate, detain, and arrest non-Indians is 
one such murky area.26 The Supreme Court has held that tribes cannot 
prosecute non-Indians in tribal court,27 but it has also recognized tribes’ 
“power to restrain those who disturb public order on the reservation, and if 
                                                                                                                 
v. Inyo Cty., No. 1:15–cv–00367–DAD–JLT, 2018 WL 347797, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 
2018).  
 21. Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a 
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 504 (1976) (coining the now-infamous term 
“jurisdictional maze”). 
 22. Addie C. Rolnick, Untangling the Web: Juvenile Justice in Indian Country, 19 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 84 (2016) (discussing the “web of criminal jurisdiction”). 
 23. Tim Vollmann, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and 
Defendants’ Rights in Conflict, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 387, 387 (1974). Practitioners share this 
view too. As an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma put it, 
determining criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is like “solving a Rubik’s cube while 
blindfolded and underwater.” David Harper, Justice Department Prosecuting More Indian 
Country Crimes, TULSA WORLD (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.tulsaworld.com/ news/local/ 
justice-department-prosecuting-more-indian-country-crimes/article_f66f7c27-48a9-5051-
8bb8-54fc69302411.html. 
 24. See infra Section I.A. 
 25. Addie C. Rolnick, Recentering Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 63 UCLA L. REV. 
1638, 1646 (2016).  
 26. See Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 
1564, 1633–35 (2016) (identifying tribal authority to arrest non-Indians as an area of 
“confusion”); see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.07 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., 2012) (observing that the presence of federal, state, and tribal officers in 
Indian country “create[s] difficult jurisdictional issues and conflicts” and that “numerous 
challenges have arisen regarding the authority of tribal officers to investigate crimes and 
make arrests involving non-Indians”). One final terminological note. As species of seizure, 
both detentions and arrests are creatures of constitutional law. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
16–19 (1968); see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 3.5, 3.8(b) 
(4th ed. 2018). An officer can conduct a brief investigatory stop if the officer reasonably 
suspects the person is engaged in criminal activity. Id. § 3.8(b). An arrest, however, requires 
probable cause. Id. § 3.3(a). Because there is no bright-line rule distinguishing the two, this 
Note advocates for clarifying the authority of tribal police to make arrests, as this necessarily 
includes the lesser power to conduct investigatory stops.  
 27. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978). 
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necessary, to eject them.”28 The result of these mixed messages is that tribal 
prosecutorial authority is often conflated with tribal law enforcement 
authority, giving rise to the belief that tribes cannot investigate or arrest 
non-Indians.29  
This is no small problem. Unsure of their authority, tribal officers may 
hesitate to respond forcefully to crimes involving non-Indians.30 Yet non-
Indians comprise the majority of the population living on tribal lands31 and 
account for most of the crime therein.32 Indeed, both the Department of 
Justice33 and the National Congress of American Indians34 have expressed 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. §1301(2) 
(2012), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 29. See Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In the absence of some form 
of state authorization . . . tribal officers have no inherent power to arrest and book non-
Indian violators.”); S. 1763, S. 872, and S. 1192: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of Thomas J. Perrelli, Associate Attorney General, 
U.S. Department of Justice) [hereinafter Statement of Thomas J. Perrelli] (“Tribal police 
officers who respond to a domestic-violence call, only to discover that the accused is a non-
Indian and therefore outside the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction, often mistakenly believe they 
cannot even make an arrest.”); WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 203–04 (6th 
ed. 2015) (“In general, powers of policing and arrest follow the criminal jurisdiction of the 
three governments . . . .”); Deborah Sullivan Brennan, Tribes Seek More Power for Their 
Police Forces, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/dec/27/ 
news/mn-5107 (“[I]n incidents involving non-tribal members or state penal code violations, 
[California tribal police] must conduct citizen’s arrests, then wait for sheriff's deputies to 
finish the job.”).  
 30. For an egregious example, see Tribal Law and Order Act One Year Later: Have We 
Improved Public Safety and Justice Throughout Indian Country?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 44 (2011) (statement of Troy A. Eid, Chairman, 
Indian Law and Order Commission) [hereinafter Tribal Law and Order Act One Year Later] 
(recounting how, after stopping an intoxicated non-Indian motorist, a tribal officer drove the 
non-Indian to his home instead of making an arrest).  
 31. The 2010 Census found that of the 4.6 million persons living in Indian country, 3.5 
million identified as non-Indian. TINA NORRIS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS BRIEFS 
NO. C2010BR-10, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2010 (Jan. 
2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf.  
 32. See infra Section I.B.1. 
 33. Statement of Thomas J. Perrelli, supra note 29, at 10. 
 34. Letter from Jefferson Keel, President, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, to Kevin 
Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, and Hilary Tompkins, 
Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of Interior 1 (July 24, 2013), http://tloa.ncai.org/files/NCAI%20 
Washburn-Tompkins%20letter_%20arrest%20authority_071013.pdf (arguing that non-
intervention by tribal police in crimes involving non-Indians “creates a vicious cycle in 
which the victims stop reporting crime because they believe that the tribal police are unable 
to stop the violence”).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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concern that the reluctance of tribal officers to arrest non-Indians 
contributes to the violence plaguing Indian Country. Although many have 
called for a restoration of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,35 
none have sought to clarify tribal police powers notwithstanding the current 
limits on tribal courts.36  
This Note takes up that task. It proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an 
overview of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country to highlight the 
difficulty of determining whether tribal, federal, or state authorities have 
prosecutorial authority over a given crime. This Part then examines the 
consequences of this jurisdictional morass for Native American 
communities and the effect that it has on tribal law enforcement 
capabilities.  
Part II considers how courts have addressed claims that tribal police lack 
authority to detain non-Indians. Although the Washington Supreme Court 
recognized the power to detain non-Indians as an aspect of inherent tribal 
sovereignty, federal courts have treated it as an extension of tribes’ right to 
exclude trespassers. That approach has led the Ninth Circuit to curb tribal 
arrest authority where the tribe cannot exclude non-Indians, such as 
highways within the reservation.37 After assessing the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach, Part II proposes two solutions to reform the doctrine. Courts 
could hold that the exclusion power is independent of tribal landowner 
status—if tribes can exclude non-Indians from the reservation entirely, it 
follows that they can make arrests anywhere within the borders of their 
domain. Alternatively, courts could find that arrest authority falls within the 
power of tribes to regulate non-Indians whose on-reservation conduct 
threatens the health and welfare of the tribe. While either route would 
clarify tribal arrest authority, both face formidable countervailing Supreme 
Court precedent. 
Next, Part III considers two available avenues to clarify the arrest 
authority of tribal law enforcement—citizen’s arrest law and cooperative 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See, e.g, Combatting Non-Indian Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault: A Call for 
a Full Oliphant Fix, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians Res. #SPO-16-037 (2016), http://www.ncai. 
org/attachments/Resolution_orvkZwEdbgGeAHMvJqyzAWvdDwRXttpGCTmoRcxCStvLS
HnXNGv_SPO-16-037%20final.pdf; INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR 
MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER 23–27 (2013); Samuel E. Ennis, Comment, Reaffirming 
Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory 
Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553 (2009).  
 36. See Riley, supra note 26, at 1635 (calling for “creative solutions to solve the 
problem of [tribal] arrest authority” in the absence of a complete Oliphant-fix).  
 37. See infra Section II.B (discussing Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2009), and 
United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2019)). 
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agreements. It argues, however, that neither is an adequate solution. The 
former hamstrings tribal police and may expose officers to significant 
liability; the latter provides only localized relief and is often unattainable or 
unreliable.  
Finally, following a well-trodden path in Indian law scholarship,38 Part 
IV proposes a legislative fix to clarify and affirm tribes’ arrest authority. In 
particular, it makes three suggestions for drafting a legally-sound and 
politically-palatable statute. The law should: (1) recognize tribal arrest 
authority as an inherent aspect of tribal sovereignty, not a delegation of 
federal authority; (2) stipulate that evidence collected by tribal police is 
covered by the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA); and (3) create a federal 
remedy for injuries stemming from the excessive use of force by tribal 
police. While no panacea, such a statute would improve public safety on the 
reservation by empowering tribal police to protect their communities from 
non-Indian criminals.  
I. Prosecutorial Authority in Indian Country 
To appreciate why tribal arrest authority is muddled, it is necessary to 
first understand prosecutorial authority in Indian Country. It is truly sui 
generis.39 Generally, criminal jurisdiction is an exercise in geography; the 
sovereign possesses the power to punish any offense committed within its 
territory.40 But tribes do not enjoy the full panoply of sovereign powers, 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See, e.g., Alison Burton, Note, What About the Children? Extending Tribal Criminal 
Jurisdiction to Crimes Against Children, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 193 (2017) (calling on 
Congress to extend VAWA to cover child abuse); Ennis, supra note 35, at 572 (proposing a 
federal statute to overturn Oliphant); Michalyn Steele, Congressional Power and 
Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 307, 336 (advocating for a federal “Tribal 
Sovereignty Affirmation Act”); Developments in the Law, Fresh Pursuit from Indian 
Country: Tribal Authority to Pursue Suspects onto State Land, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 
1700–01 (2016) (proposing federal legislation authorizing tribal police to pursue non-Indians 
outside the reservation if the engagement began in Indian country).  
 39. Indeed, this could fairly be said about the field of Indian law writ large. See United 
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (“[The] relation of Indian tribes . . . to the 
people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one, and of complex character.”); 
Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 802 (2007) 
(“American Indian tribes do not neatly fit into existing legal paradigms because they inhabit 
a strange sovereign space in the U.S. legal system, one which they alone occupy.”). 
 40. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909), overruled on 
other grounds by W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990) 
(“[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful 
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”); David Wolitz, 
Criminal Jurisdiction and the Nation-State: Toward Bounded Pluralism, 91 OR. L. REV. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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relegated instead to being “domestic dependent nations.”41 One 
consequence of this status is that the Supreme Court and Congress have 
disaggregated geography from criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country and 
replaced that simple principle with a welter of rules which assign 
prosecutorial authority to various sovereigns depending on the crime’s 
factual circumstances.  
A. “A Journey Through the Jurisdictional Maze”42  
1. Where, Who, and What: The Criminal Jurisdiction Variables  
Determining which sovereign can prosecute the defendant turns on three 
factors: (1) the crime’s location; (2) the Indian status of the perpetrator and 
victim; and (3) the nature of the crime. Depending on these elements, a case 
may fall within the exclusive purview of one sovereign—or two may share 
concurrent jurisdiction. 
The threshold question is whether the offense occurred in “Indian 
Country” because only then is tribal jurisdiction a possibility.43 A term of 
art defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, Indian Country includes: (a) Indian 
reservations; (b) dependent Indian communities; and (c) Indian allotments 
to which Indian title has not been extinguished.44 First, a reservation is 
public land that the federal government has set aside for a tribe.45 Notably, 
because § 1151(a) covers “all lands” within a reservation, Indian Country 
includes public roads and property owned by non-Indians located within the 
                                                                                                                 
725, 731 (2013) (observing that under the “traditional model” of criminal jurisdiction, “one 
could determine which criminal code, which prosecutor’s office, and which court system had 
jurisdiction simply by finding the location of the crime within a particular sovereign state”). 
 41. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); see also Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (holding that tribes’ “rights to complete 
sovereignty, as independent nations, [were] necessarily diminished” by European conquest). 
 42. Clinton, supra note 21, at 503. 
 43. See CANBY, supra note 29, at 194 (“The jurisdiction of a tribe is generally confined 
to crimes committed within the geographical limits of its reservation and, presumably, any 
of its dependent Indian communities.”); cf. Fife v. Moore, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1314–15 
(E.D. Okla. 2011) (enjoining tribal prosecution of tribal citizens where the crime occurred on 
fee land outside the reservation). But perhaps this is changing. See Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 
849, 863 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding tribe could exercise criminal jurisdiction over a tribal 
citizen for a sexual assault allegedly committed at the tribe’s off-reservation community 
center). For an argument that tribal criminal jurisdiction should have extraterritorial reach, 
see Rolnick, supra note 25, at 1673–79. 
 44. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).  
 45. See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFF., 
https://www.bia.gov/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Nov. 5, 2018); cf. United States 
v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/7
No. 1]   TRIBAL AUTHORITY TO ARREST NON-INDIANS 171 
 
 
reservation.46 Second, a dependent Indian community refers to land that has 
been set aside for the use of the tribe and is under federal superintendence.47 
Finally, Indian Country includes parcels of land held in trust by the federal 
government for an Indian, regardless of whether the land is located within 
reservation boundaries.48 
If the crime occurred in Indian Country, the next task is to determine if 
either the perpetrator or victim are “Indian.” A matter of federal common 
law,49 who qualifies as an Indian for criminal jurisdiction purposes turns on 
a two-prong test that considers “(1) the degree of Indian blood; and (2) 
tribal or governmental recognition as an Indian.”50 The first prong “requires 
ancestry living in America before the Europeans arrived . . . .”51 The second 
prong demands that the person be recognized as an Indian by either the 
federal government or a federally recognized tribe.52 Recognition depends 
on a plethora of factors, including tribal enrollment, use of Indian services, 
enjoyment of tribal benefits, and participation in tribal life through 
residence on the reservation and attendance at social events.53 In the 
absence of tribal enrollment, which is often treated as dispositive evidence 
of tribal affiliation,54 the inquiry boils down to whether the person is 
                                                                                                                 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a). 
 47. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998).  
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c).  
 49. The term’s origin reaches back to United States v. Rogers, where the Supreme Court 
held that a Caucasian man who had become a naturalized Cherokee citizen was not an Indian 
for the purposes of federal law. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572–73 (1846). In so ruling, the Court 
concluded that being Indian requires a degree of Indian descent and political recognition as 
Indian. Id. 
 50. United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United 
States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“[P]roof of Indian 
status . . . requires only two things: (1) proof of some quantum of Indian blood, whether or 
not that blood derives from a member of a federally recognized tribe, and (2) proof of 
membership in, or affiliation with, a federally recognized tribe.”).  
 51. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 52. Id. at 1224. 
 53. Id. Unsurprisingly, this prong is not applied consistently across the courts of 
appeals, with the Ninth Circuit examining only these four factors “in declining order of 
importance,” Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1114, and the Eighth Circuit considering these and other 
factors in no particular rank-order, United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 763–66 (8th Cir. 
2009). For additional background on the Rogers test and critique of it, see Alex Tallchief 
Skibine, Indians, Race, and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 
49 (2017).  
 54. See Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 764 (stating that if “the defendant is an enrolled tribal 
member . . . that factor becomes dispositive”); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 455 
(7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250, 1251 (4th Cir. 1976). But see 
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acknowledged as an Indian by the relevant community.55 Given that both 
parts of the inquiry are fact-intensive, it is perhaps an understatement to say 
that defining “exactly who is and who is not an Indian is very imprecise.”56 
The final step is to determine the crime that occurred. This element has 
two prongs: first, whether there is a victim; and second, if so, the severity of 
the offense. As discussed below, jurisdiction may change depending on 
whether the perpetrator committed a victimless crime—i.e., driving while 
intoxicated—because federal law does not cover such offenses.57 The 
severity of the crime may also be relevant: if both the perpetrator and 
victim are Indian, then the federal government has jurisdiction only over 
“major” crimes like murder or kidnapping. The tribe with which both 
parties are affiliated retains exclusive jurisdiction of all other intra-Indian 
crimes.58 Armed with the proper tools, it is now time to enter the maze.  
2. Tribal, Federal, and State Jurisdiction  
Tribal: As a general matter, tribes lack jurisdiction over non-Indians but 
can punish any Indian for violations of tribal law. The prohibition against 
prosecuting non-Indians stems from Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,59 
perhaps the most reviled decision in Indian law.60 There, the Supreme Court 
held that, like the powers to alienate land and engage in foreign relations, 
                                                                                                                 
Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1225 (opining that “enrollment, and, indeed, even eligibility therefor, is 
not dispositive of Indian status”); United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1282–83 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (holding that stipulation that victims belonged to pueblo was insufficient to prove 
Indian status absent evidence that Indian blood was a requirement for tribal membership). 
 55. See United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2009); Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 
762.  
 56. United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976).  
 57. See infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.  
 58. See infra notes 84–96 and accompanying text.  
 59. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 60. Criticism of Oliphant pervades the canon. See, e.g., Russell Lawrence Barsh & 
James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the 
Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609, 610 (1979) (“A close examination of the 
Court's opinion reveals a carelessness with history, logic, precedent, and statutory 
construction that is not ordinarily acceptable from so august a tribunal.”); Philip P. Frickey, 
A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal 
Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 34–39 (1999) (arguing that Oliphant “lack[s] 
coherence”). In fact, in a 2009 poll on Turtle Talk, a widely read Indian law blog, readers 
identified Oliphant as the Supreme Court decision that most undermines tribal sovereignty. 
See First Turtle Talk Poll Results—Oliphant Biggest Frustration, TURTLE TALK (Mar. 9, 
2009, 9:42 AM), https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2009/03/09/first-turtle-talk-poll-results-
oliphant-biggest-frustration/.  
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tribes were implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians by 
submitting to the sovereignty of the United States.61 Although the Court 
acknowledged that its ruling would impair a tribe’s ability to maintain 
public safety on its land, it left it to Congress to decide “whether Indian 
tribes should finally be authorized to try non-Indians.”62  
Forty years later, Oliphant remains the law of the land with one (small) 
exception.63 Through the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA), Congress extended to tribes “special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons” in Indian Country.64 Though 
helpful, this jurisdiction is highly circumscribed: either the victim or the 
perpetrator must be an Indian,65 the perpetrator must have “ties” to the 
tribe,66 and the statute only covers three crimes.67 Thus, while the VAWA 
constitutes a partial “Oliphant-fix,” tribal criminal law remains generally 
unenforceable against non-Indians.  
In contrast, a tribe has criminal jurisdiction over all Indians within its 
territory. The Supreme Court has long recognized that tribes have “the 
inherent power to prescribe laws for their members and to punish 
infractions of those laws.”68 When a tribe enforces tribal law against one of 
its own members, it is therefore exercising “primeval sovereignty, [which] 
has never been taken away from [it], either explicitly or implicitly, and is 
attributable in no way to any delegation . . . of federal authority.”69  
In addition, tribes can prosecute nonmember Indians, albeit as a result of 
congressional action. Following Oliphant, the Court held in Duro v. Reina70 
that criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians was inconsistent with 
tribal sovereignty.71 “[I]n the criminal sphere[,] membership marks the 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209–10. 
 62. Id. at 212.  
 63. See United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1960 n.4 (2016) (“Tribal governments 
generally lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian 
country.”).  
 64. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(b)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–25). 
 65. Id. § 1304(b)(4)(A). 
 66. See id. § 1304(b)(4)(B). 
 67. Those crimes are violations of protective orders, dating violence, and domestic 
violence. Id. § 1304(c).  
 68. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); accord Talton v. Mayes, 163 
U.S. 376, 380 (1896).  
 69. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328. 
 70. 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012), as 
recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 71. Duro, 495 U.S. at 685. 
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bounds of tribal authority,”72 the Court explained, because only members 
can participate in tribal government affairs like voting or holding elected 
office.73 As in Oliphant, the Court invited Congress to deal with the 
fallout.74 This time, however, Congress acted. The same year Duro was 
decided, Congress amended ICRA to clarify that tribes have inherent 
sovereign authority to prosecute “all Indians.”75 The “Duro-Fix” was later 
upheld in United States v. Lara,76 in which the Court held that “the 
Constitution authorizes Congress to permit tribes, as an exercise of their 
inherent tribal authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians.”77  
Federal: Federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country stems from 
two statutes: the General Crimes Act (GCA)78 and the Major Crimes Act 
(MCA).79 The GCA makes federal criminal law generally applicable to 
Indian Country.80 Although broad, the GCA contains three limitations: (1) it 
does not cover crimes committed by an Indian against another Indian81; (2) 
it exempts from federal jurisdiction Indians who have already been 
punished by their tribe or where the exercise of jurisdiction is precluded by 
treaty82; and (3) as a matter of federalism, the federal government cannot 
prosecute a non-Indian if no Indians are involved.83 The MCA narrows the 
GCA’s carve-outs by granting the federal government jurisdiction over an 
Indian who commits one of fourteen enumerated “major” crimes, regardless 
of whether the victim is an Indian or whether the tribe sanctions the 
perpetrator.84 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Id. at 693.  
 73. Id. at 688. 
 74. Id. at 698 (“If the present jurisdictional scheme proves insufficient to meet the 
practical needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to address the problem 
is Congress, which has the ultimate authority over Indian affairs.”). 
 75. Defense Appropriations Act for FY 91, Pub. L. No. 101-938, § 8077(b)–(d) (1990) 
(amending 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)).  
 76. 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 77. Id. at 210. 
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). 
 79. Id. § 1153.  
 80. Id. § 1152. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.  
 83. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881). 
 84. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-25). The fourteen crimes are 
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual abuse, incest, assault with intent to commit 
murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, assault 
against an individual under the age of sixteen, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, 
and robbery.  
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State: State criminal jurisdiction is narrow in theory but broad in fact. As 
a matter of black-letter law, state criminal law does not penetrate 
reservation boundaries.85 But there are two significant exceptions. First, 
states possess exclusive jurisdiction over a non-Indian who commits a 
crime in Indian Country that is either victimless or against a non-Indian.86 
In such cases, the tribe lacks jurisdiction per Oliphant, and the federal 
government has no authority under the GCA or MCA. Second, Congress 
transferred criminal jurisdiction over Indian territory to state authorities in 
six states and provided a mechanism by which other states could exercise 
this power.87 Known as Public Law 280, the statute markedly altered the 
jurisdictional landscape. Participating states can prosecute minor crimes 
committed by Indians—crimes that would otherwise be the exclusive 
purview of the tribes. And there is an entirely different cast of characters at 
play: county police, district attorneys, and state courts replace the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA), Department of Justice, and federal judiciary. But most 
impressive is the law’s reach—as of 2000, it extended state criminal 
jurisdiction to nearly a quarter of the reservation-based tribal population.88 
Having mapped the maze, this Note pivots to examine the consequences of 
divvying up criminal jurisdiction among three sovereigns.  
                                                                                                                 
 85. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 26, § 9.03 (“As a 
general rule, states lack jurisdiction in Indian country absent a special grant of 
jurisdiction.”); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561–62 (1832) (vacating 
Georgia’s conviction of a missionary for entering Cherokee territory without a state license 
on the ground that the Cherokee Tribe is “a distinct community” where “the laws of Georgia 
can have no force”). 
 86. See McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624; see also Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2 
(1984) (“Within Indian country, State jurisdiction is limited to crimes by non-Indians against 
non-Indians, and victimless crimes by non-Indians.”) (citations omitted); cf. United States v. 
Langford, 641 F.3d 1195, 1197–1200 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that only the state has 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian who participated in a cock fighting ring on a 
reservation).  
 87. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1162 (2018)). California, Oregon (except the Warm Springs Reservation), 
Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Minnesota (except the Red Lake Reservation) are the mandatory 
Public Law 280 states. Alaska (except the Metlakatla Reservation) became a mandatory 
Public Law 280 state upon statehood. Id. To date, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, 
Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington are voluntary Public Law 280 
jurisdictions. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 26, § 6.04 n.272. For 
more on Public Law 280 generally, see Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public 
Law 280 Fit for The Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697 
(2006).  
 88. Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 87, at 697.  
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B. The “Maze of Injustice”89  
1. The Harm to Native Communities 
The criminal jurisdiction maze has led to a “public safety crisis” in 
Indian Country.90 The statistics are stark. Historically, Native Americans 
are more likely than any other ethnic group to be the victims of violence,91 
and in a recent survey, four in five respondents reported having experienced 
violence in his or her lifetime.92 Native women especially suffer. The 
murder rate of Indian women is ten times the national average in some 
areas,93 and they are more than twice as likely to be raped as Caucasian 
women.94 Non-violent crime is also woefully high in Indian Country.95 For 
example, between 2008 and 2010, tribal officials reported 54,000 property 
crimes to the FBI.96 
Non-Indians are largely to blame. According to the Department of 
Justice, 86% of reported rapes and sexual assaults experienced by Native 
women were perpetrated by non-Native men.97 And a 2016 survey of 
approximately 4000 Native Americans found that, of those who had 
experienced violence during their lifetime, 97% of Indian women and 90% 
of Indian men reported having been victimized by a non-Indian.98 In 
contrast, only 35% of female victims and 33% of male victims reported 
having been victimized by an Indian.  
                                                                                                                 
 89. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN 
FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 1 (2007) [hereinafter MAZE OF INJUSTICE]. 
 90. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 35, at iii. 
 91. STEVEN W PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 203097, AMERICAN INDIANS AND 
CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE 1992–2002, at 5–6 (Dec. 2004), https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf [hereinafter PERRY, BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE]. 
 92. ANDRE B. ROSAY, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN 
AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND MEN 3 (Sept. 2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/249822.pdf.  
 93. RONET BACHMAN ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA 
NATIVE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 5 (2008).  
 94. Emiko Petrosky et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in Homicides of Adult Women 
and the Role of Intimate Partner Violence—United States, 2003–2014, 66 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 741, 741–46 (Jul. 21, 2017).  
 95. See STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TECH. REP. NO. NCJ 239077, TRIBAL 
CRIME DATA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, 2012, at 9 (Oct. 2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/tcdca12.pdf. 
 96. Id. 
 97. PERRY, BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, supra note 91, at 9.  
 98. ROSAY, supra note 92, at 4.  
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Because of Oliphant, Native victims must rely on state or federal 
authorities to prosecute non-Indian offenders. But justice is rarely served. 
Understaffed and insufficiently funded, law enforcement agencies struggle 
to maintain public safety in Indian Country, areas which are often remote 
and sparsely populated.99 Investigations—if they occur—proceed slowly.100 
In the meantime, witnesses disappear, evidence spoils, and perpetrators 
escape. As a result, prosecutors often decline to file charges.101 Even when 
prosecutors bring charges, the abysmal convictions rate only makes things 
worse. It turns Indian Country into a safe haven for non-Indian criminals,102 
deters the reporting of crime,103 and breeds distrust among Native 
Americans towards federal and state law enforcement.104  
2. The Harm to Tribal Law Enforcement Authority 
Beyond its toll on tribal members, the status quo hinders the ability of 
tribal police to maintain public safety on the reservation. Tribal police may 
be reluctant to investigate or pursue a suspect unless it is clear that the tribe 
has prosecutorial jurisdiction for fear that their action will dissuade federal 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
709, 719 (2006) (“[A]gent[s] handling Indian country investigations often work alone in 
rural settings and may travel hundreds of miles of reservation roads in the course of a week’s 
work.”); MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 42 (“The US Departments of Justice and of 
the Interior have both acknowledged that there is inadequate law enforcement in Indian 
Country and identified lack of funds as a central cause.”).  
 100. See MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 43 (“Women on the Reservation who 
report sexual violence often have to wait for hours or even days before receiving a 
response . . . . Sometimes they receive no response at all.”); Goldberg & Champagne, supra 
note 87, at 711–14 (finding police response rates worse in Public Law 280 states than tribal 
lands under federal control).  
 101. See, e.g., MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 66–67 (describing the high rate of 
declined cases by federal prosecutors). In 2015, federal prosecutors declined roughly 40% of 
cases received. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF 
THE DEPARTMENT’S TRIBAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS PURSUANT TO THE TRIBAL LAW AND 
ORDER ACT OF 2010, at 10 tbl. 2 (Dec. 2017), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/e1801.pdf. 
 102. See Sierra Crane-Murdoch, On Indian Land, Criminals Can Get Away with Almost 
Anything, ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/ 
on-indian-land-criminals-can-get-away-with-almost-anything/273391/ (“Every officer could 
recount being told by a non-Indian, ‘You can't do anything to me.’”); Louise Erdich, Rape 
on the Reservation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/ 
opinion/native-americans-and-the-violence-against-women-act.html (describing how the 
Oliphant rule “attract[s] non-Indian habitual sexual predators to tribal areas”). 
 103. See MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 4. 
 104. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 35; Washburn, supra note 99, at 
735–40 (detailing the cultural barriers facing federal prosecutors in Indian country). 
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or state involvement.105 Yet in many cases, it is impossible for the first 
responders to the scene to determine whether the offense occurred in Indian 
Country and whether the suspect is an Indian, the two prerequisites for 
tribal jurisdiction.106 For starters, the line dividing state land and Indian 
Country can be blurry.107 Tribes and states frequently dispute not just the 
precise contours of the reservation,108 but whether huge swathes of land are 
classified as Indian Country.109 Further adding to the complexity, Indian 
Country is not static. For instance, an Indian could take their allotment out 
of trust to sell it or to obtain a mortgage, transforming the property into 
state land.110 Indianness is even more difficult to discern.111 As the Ninth 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 42 (“In some instances federal authorities 
may reportedly not pursue cases in which tribal police have begun an investigation. Officers 
from one tribal law enforcement agency told Amnesty International that they were reluctant 
to take steps to preserve evidence at a major crime scene for this reason.”); Tribal Law and 
Order Act One Year Later, supra note 30, at 69 (statement of Jacqueline Johnson-Pata) 
(“[Jurisdictional] cloudiness creates a loss of time and money, but what it also does in the 
law enforcement arena, it brings in inaction because it is easier sometimes not to have those 
questions.”).  
 106. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 35, at 9.  
 107. See Michael Riley, 1885 Law at Root of Jurisdictional Jumble, DENVER POST (Nov. 
9, 2007 3:51 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2007/11/09/1885-law-at-root-of-juris 
dictional-jumble/ (“[A] change by a few feet in the location of a crime can determine 
whether it’s under state, tribal or federal authority.”).  
 108. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 235, 238–39 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(acknowledging that the St. Regis Mohawk and New York contest whether the land on 
which the vehicle stop occurred was outside the reservation’s borders but finding the issue 
inapposite because one of the tribal officers was cross-deputized as a federal officer).  
 109. See Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub. nom. 
Carpenter v. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 2026 (2018) (No. 17-1107) (holding that three million acres 
of eastern Oklahoma is Indian country such that the state lacked criminal jurisdiction over an 
Indian defendant); see also Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 
351 (1962) (vacating state burglary conviction of an Indian upon finding that Congress had 
not diminished the reservation); State v. Frank, 2002-NMSC-026, 132 N.M. 544, 52 P.3d 
404 (affirming state conviction of Indian because situs of crime was not a dependent Indian 
community).  
 110. Cf. Cross-deputization Helps Solve Jurisdictional Issues, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY 
(June 4, 2007), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/cross-deputization-helps-
solve-jurisdictional-issues-Aki_R6e-sUySuxyHn-TwFQ/ (“You respond to a call and if the 
incident occurred in the house, it’s state jurisdiction. If it happened in the driveway, it’s 
tribal jurisdiction. So it does become very complicated . . . .” (quoting Jason O’Neal, Chief 
of the Chickasaw Police Department)).  
 111. See MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 34 (“[I]t may take weeks or months to 
determine if it’s Indian land or not; investigators usually cannot determine this, they need 
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Circuit acknowledged, “[a] person can have significant Native American 
ancestry and nonetheless not be an Indian” under federal law, while “a 
person can be an Indian for tribal law enforcement purposes even if that 
person does not have any of the physical characteristics associated with 
Native American heritage.”112 United States v. Keys113 is illustrative of this 
challenge. There, it took tribal police several days to determine whether the 
suspect was an Indian after a search of the National Crime Information 
Center database revealed four notations labeling him Caucasian but also 
two listing him as Indian.114 Worse yet, if it is clear that the suspect is a 
non-Indian, many tribal officers believe that they cannot intervene in an 
ongoing crime or make an arrest.115 In fact, as recently as 2013, the BIA 
reportedly instructed tribal police that they had no authority over non-
Indians.116  
The status quo is untenable. Abrogating Oliphant is certainly one 
remedy. But, in the interim, this Note advances another, albeit more 
modest, proposal: clarify and affirm the authority of tribal law enforcement 
to arrest non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian Country. This Note now 
turns to explore several avenues to achieve that goal. 
II. Tribal Authority to Arrest Non-Indians 
The Supreme Court has addressed the ability of tribal police to arrest 
non-Indians only in passing. In Duro v. Reina,117 it opined:  
[Tribes] possess their traditional and undisputed power to 
exclude persons whom they deem to be undesirable from tribal 
lands. Tribal law enforcement authorities have the power to 
restrain those who disturb public order on the reservation, and if 
necessary, to eject them. Where jurisdiction to try and punish an 
offender rests outside the tribe, tribal officers may exercise their 
                                                                                                                 
attorneys to do it by going through court and title records to make a determination.” (quoting 
Assistant U.S. Attorney (name withheld))).  
 112. United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2019).  
 113. 390 F. Supp. 2d 875 (D.N.D. 2005).  
 114. Id. at 878. Only after calling every tribe in North Dakota to check enrollment lists, 
did the officers conclude that the tribe was without jurisdiction. Id.  
 115. See Letter from Jefferson Keel, supra note 34. 
 116. Id. 
 117. 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012), as 
recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
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power to detain the offender and transport him to the proper 
authorities.118 
This three-sentence exposition leaves much to be desired. Is the 
“undisputed power to exclude” an aspect of tribes’ criminal or civil 
authority, or does it flow from the reservoir of inherent sovereignty? Is the 
term “tribal lands” coextensive with § 1151’s definition of “Indian 
Country”? What acts “disturb the public order”? How long can tribes 
“detain the offender” before they must “transport him” to a non-tribal 
jurisdiction?  
Federal and state courts have struggled to apply Duro to tribal arrests of 
non-Indians. In particular, the Ninth Circuit’s approach has added a new set 
of hedges to the criminal jurisdiction maze, which, this Note posits, are 
impossible to navigate and undermine public safety. After analyzing and 
critiquing the case law, this Part offers two jurisprudential solutions to 
clarify tribal arrest authority.  
A. Tribal Arrest Authority as an Exercise of Tribal Sovereignty 
In State v. Schmuck,119 the Washington Supreme Court held that tribal 
police authority over non-Indians is not merely an expression of tribes’ 
power of exclusion, but a power flowing from their “general authority as 
sovereign.”120 A redux of Oliphant, the Suquamish tribal police in Schmuck 
stopped David Schmuck, a non-Indian, for speeding on a public road within 
the reservation.121 After smelling alcohol, the officer performing the stop 
asked Schmuck if he would consent to field sobriety tests.122 When 
Schmuck refused, the officer told him he was not free to leave until 
Washington State Patrol arrived.123 Schmuck relented and agreed to 
perform the tests, which he failed. He was arrested by a state trooper who 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 696–97. 
 119. 850 P.2d 1332 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).  
 120. Id. at 1341.  
 121. Id. at 1333–34. Oliphant’s petitioners—Mark Oliphant and Daniel Belgrade—both 
faced prosecutions in Suquamish tribal court. The police arrested Mark Oliphant for resisting 
arrest and assaulting an officer while drunk at the Tribe’s Chief Seattle Day festival. Later in 
the same year, they arrested Daniel Belgarde for reckless endangerment after a high-speed 
chase ended with him crashing into a tribal police car. And who should the police find as a 
passenger in Belgrade’s car, but none other than Oliphant? See Sarah Krakoff, Mark the 
Plumber v. Tribal Empire, or Non-Indian Anxiety v. Tribal Sovereignty? The Story of 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 270–71 (Carole Goldberg et al. 
eds., 2011). 
 122. Schmuck, 850 P.2d at 1334. 
 123. Id.  
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arrived twenty minutes later.124 Convicted of driving while intoxicated, 
Schmuck appealed on the ground that the initial traffic stop and subsequent 
detention were illegal because he was non-Indian.125  
The court rejected his claims and upheld the arrest. Regarding the stop, 
the court found that this power was “[f]undamental” to enforcing the tribe’s 
traffic code.126 In its view, a rule limiting stops to only tribal members 
“would put tribal officers in the impossible position of being unable to stop 
any driver” for the simple reason that “[o]nly by stopping the vehicle could 
he determine whether the driver was an Indian.”127 This would “seriously 
undercut the Tribe’s ability to enforce tribal law, . . . render the traffic code 
virtually meaningless, . . . [and] ‘run contrary to the well-established federal 
policy of furthering Indian self-determination.’”128  
With respect to the detention, the court found that the tribal officer’s 
conduct comported with Duro because he “detained Schmuck and promptly 
delivered him up” to state authorities.129 The fact that Schmuck was driving 
on a public road did not alter the calculus. First, the court noted that the 
federal definition of “Indian Country” covers all land within an Indian 
reservation, “including rights-of-way.”130 Second, it observed that “the 
Tribe’s authority to stop and detain is not necessarily based exclusively on 
the power to exclude non-Indians.”131 Rather, it “may also be derived from 
the Tribe’s general authority as sovereign.”132 The court acknowledged that, 
under the Supreme Court’s decision in Montana v. United States,133 tribes 
generally lack jurisdiction over nonmembers on non-Indian land within the 
reservation.134 But Montana carved out two exceptions to that rule, one of 
which is that tribes may regulate non-Indians whose “conduct threatens or 
has some direct effect on the . . . health or welfare of the tribe.”135 The 
Schmuck court reasoned that detaining non-Indian motorists fell within the 
sweep of this exception because “[a]llowing a known drunk driver to get 
back in his or her car, careen off down the road, and possibly kill or injure 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 1334–35. 
 126. Id. at 1337.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978)).  
 129. Id. at 1339–40. 
 130. Id. at 1341 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2012)).  
 131. Id. (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982)).  
 132. Id. 
 133. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 134. Schmuck, 850 P.2d at 1341. 
 135. Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 544) (emphasis omitted).  
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Indians or non-Indians would certainly be detrimental to the health or 
welfare of the Tribe.”136 Thus, the court concluded that tribal police have 
“inherent authority to stop and detain a non-Indian who has allegedly 
violated state and tribal law on the reservation until he or she can be turned 
over to state authorities for charging and prosecution.”137  
B. Tribal Arrest Authority as an Exercise of the Tribal Exclusion Power 
1. Decisions Affirming Tribal Arrests of Non-Indians  
In contrast to Schmuck, the Ninth and Eighth Circuits have treated tribes’ 
authority to stop, investigate, and detain non-Indians within Indian Country 
as an exercise of their power to exclude.138 In the Ninth Circuit case, United 
States v. Becerra-Garcia,139 tribal rangers with the Tohono O’odham Tribe 
stopped Efrain Becerra-Garcia and detained him after discovering twenty 
undocumented immigrants crammed in his van.140 Becerra-Garcia pleaded 
guilty to transporting illegal aliens141 and then appealed, arguing the stop 
was per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the rangers 
lacked authority to seize him under federal, state, or tribal law.142  
The court declined to adopt his bright-line rule.143 “Intrinsic in tribal 
sovereignty is the power to exclude trespassers from the reservation,” and 
this “necessarily entails investigating potential trespassers.”144 Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 1342 (emphasis added).  
 138. The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue in an unpublished opinion. See United States 
v. Green, 140 F. App’x. 798, 800 (10th Cir. 2005) (summarily dismissing non-Indian 
defendant’s claim that Creek Nation tribal police lacked authority to stop, citing Duro v. 
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit actually beat the Duro Court to 
the punch, ruling in 1975 that tribal police could stop and investigate non-Indians for 
violations of state or federal law. See Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1181 
(9th Cir. 1975). As in Duro, the panel opinion relied on the tribe’s exclusion power to justify 
the arrest. Id. at 1180.  
 139. 397 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2005).  
 140. Id. at 1169–71.  
 141. Id. at 1170. 
 142. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 15–21, United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167 
(9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-10654), 2005 WL 1067010.  
 143. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d at 1175. With respect to the Fourth Amendment, the court 
observed that although the Fourth Amendment does not apply to tribal law enforcement, 
ICRA “imposes an ‘identical limitation’ on tribal government conduct as the Fourth 
Amendment.” Id. at 1171 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329 (1978)). As 
such, the court applied Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to determine whether the evidence 
derived from the stop was admissible. Id.  
 144. Id. at 1175. 
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“[t]he claim that the rangers lack specific tribal authority to stop vehicles 
does not transform this otherwise reasonable stop into an unreasonable 
one.”145 Because Becerra-Garcia did not dispute the lower court’s finding 
that the rangers had reasonable suspicion to stop him, the court affirmed his 
conviction.146  
The Eighth Circuit applied “the rule of Duro” in United States v. Terry147 
to reach a similar result. In Terry, tribal police apprehended Randy Terry on 
the Oglala Pine Ridge Reservation “for driving while intoxicated, spousal 
abuse, violating liquor ordinances, and disorderly conduct.”148 Unsure 
whether Terry was an Indian, the tribal police called the local sheriff to 
retrieve him.149 The sheriff asked if the tribe could hold Terry overnight 
because the county only had one part-time deputy, and he was located 
eighty miles away.150 The next morning, before the sheriff arrived, Terry 
waived his Miranda rights and spoke to a tribal investigator.151 Charged 
with domestic violence and possessing a firearm as a felon, Terry entered a 
conditional guilty plea and then appealed the denial of his suppression 
motion.152 Citing Oliphant, he posited that “[j]ust as state police do not 
have authority to arrest an Indian in Indian country, tribal police have no 
authority to arrest a non-Indian.”153  
The court disagreed. Duro, not Oliphant, was the controlling authority, 
as the Oglala merely sought to arrest Terry, not prosecute him.154 And the 
initial seizure fell squarely “within the rule of Duro” because the officers 
summoned the county sheriff upon realizing Terry was likely a non-
Indian.155 But the court hedged on whether Duro permitted the tribe to hold 
Terry overnight. Rather than relying on the tribe’s inherent sovereignty, the 
court justified Terry’s stint in tribal jail on the ground that the officers held 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. at 1174–75. 
 147. 400 F.3d 575, 580 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 148. Id. at 578. 
 149. Id. at 578–79. The tribal officer suspected that Terry was “probably not Indian 
because it would be unlikely that an Indian from Pine Ridge would be subject to a Nebraska 
protection order,” as was Terry. Id. at 597.  
 150. Id. at 579. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 577–78. 
 153. Appellant’s Brief at 8, Terry, 400 F.3d 575 (No. 04-2595), 2004 WL 2731072 
(citation omitted). 
 154. Terry, 400 F.3d at 580. 
 155. Id. 
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him “pursuant to the express instructions and authority of [the sheriff].”156 
Finding the detention reasonable, the court held that the district court did 
not err in admitting the evidence.157 
Lower courts have applied Becerra-Garcia and Terry to the seizure of 
non-Indians by tribal police, but the decisions are relatively fact-bound. 
One court denied a defendant’s motion to suppress in which he alleged that 
his status as a non-Indian rendered his detention unreasonable.158 The court 
disposed of his claim with a citation to Terry and concluded that the seizure 
was reasonable because tribal police contacted state and federal authorities 
after the arrest and only held the defendant for five hours.159 In contrast, 
another court distinguished Terry to hold the interrogation of a non-Indian 
defendant by tribal officers constituted an unreasonable detention.160 The 
facts of the case, however, all but compelled this outcome—the defendant 
spent two days in tribal jail before the interrogation, the officers knew he 
was not Indian prior to questioning, and the officers told the defendant he 
would be released afterward regardless of what he said.161  
Thus, while Schmuck provides one doctrinal avenue to recognizing tribal 
arrest authority, the federal courts have instead opted to ground tribal arrest 
authority on tribes’ power to exclude trespassers.  
2. Decisions Constraining Tribal Authority to Arrest Non-Indians 
Although the decisions above suggest that tribal law enforcement 
officers enjoy robust power over non-Indians, the exclusion-based approach 
has drastically cabined tribal arrest authority by making it contingent on the 
status of the land where the seizure occurs. This doctrinal aberration got its 
start in Bressi v. Ford.162 That case began when Thomas Bressi, a non-
Indian, refused to provide identification to Tohono O’odham tribal police 
while stopped at a roadblock that the tribe had erected on a highway 
running through the reservation.163 In response, the officers handcuffed 
Bressi and detained him until he signed state citations for failing to provide 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 580–81 (evidence recovered from car was lawful under plain view or 
automobile exception); see id. at 582 (statements were voluntarily made to tribal 
investigator).  
 158. United States v. Peters, No. 3:16-cr-30150-RAL, 2017 WL 1383676, at *2–3 
(D.S.D. Apr. 13, 2017).  
 159. Id. 
 160. United States v. Keys, 390 F. Supp. 2d 875, 883–84 (D.N.D. 2005). 
 161. Id. at 884.  
 162. 575 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 163. Id. at 894.  
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a driver’s license and failure to comply with a police officer’s orders.164 
After a failed prosecution by the state, Bressi filed suit in federal court 
against the tribal officers, all of whom had been deputized to enforce 
Arizona law, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,165 a statute that creates a private 
cause of action against any “person who, under color of” state law deprives 
a citizen of their federal constitutional rights.166  
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers,167 
but the Ninth Circuit reversed.168 Writing for the panel, Judge Canby first 
observed that “the fact that the roadblock was set up on a state highway” 
made things “complicated.”169 The state highway was part of Indian 
Country under § 1151.170 “The tribe therefore has full law enforcement 
authority over its members and nonmember Indians on that 
highway.”171  
But then there was Strate v. A-1 Contractors.172 There, the Supreme 
Court held that Montana’s presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over 
non-Indians on non-Indian land within the reservation applied to a tribal 
court lawsuit concerning an accident between non-Indians on a public 
highway running through the reservation.173 In reaching this decision, the 
Strate Court concluded that the highway where the accident occurred was 
effectively non-Indian land because the tribe had consented to its 
construction, received payment for the road from the state, and had 
“retained no gatekeeping right” over it.174 Consequently, “[s]o long as the 
stretch [of highway running through the reservation] is maintained as part 
of the State’s highway, the Tribes cannot assert a landowner’s right to 
occupy and exclude.”175 
                                                                                                                 
 164. Id.  
 165. See id. at 893–94. Bressi also brought a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that the tribal officers 
were federal agents because the roadblock was also manned by U.S. Customs and Border 
agents. Id. at 898. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of this claim on 
the basis that the presence of federal officers did not transform the tribal police into federal 
actors. Id.  
 166. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  
 167. Bressi, 575 F.3d at 895.  
 168. Id. at 898.  
 169. Id. at 895.  
 170. Id. at 896. 
 171. Id.  
 172. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
 173. See id. at 454–56. 
 174. Id. at 456. 
 175. Id.  
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Bressi, citing Strate and Duro, thus held that because “[t]he usual tribal 
power of exclusion of nonmembers does not apply” to reservation 
highways, “tribal officers have no inherent power to arrest and book non-
Indian violators” on such roads.176 But the court acknowledged that strict 
adherence to this rule posed “obvious practical difficulties” because “a 
tribal officer who observes a vehicle violating tribal law on a state highway 
has no way of knowing whether the driver is an Indian or non-Indian.”177 It 
is therefore reasonable for tribal officers to stop non-Indian motorists 
because the imposition on the motorist is relatively minor and the officer 
usually possesses some evidence that tribal law has been violated.178  
However, roadblocks are a different story. These stops are per se 
“suspicionless” and are more likely to sweep up non-Indians.179 Striking a 
compromise, the court stated:  
[A] roadblock on a public right-of-way within tribal territory, 
established on tribal authority, is permissible only to the extent 
that the suspicionless stop of non-Indians is limited to the 
amount of time, and the nature of inquiry, that can establish 
whether or not they are Indians. When obvious violations, such 
as alcohol impairment, are found, detention on tribal authority 
for delivery to state officers is authorized. But inquiry going 
beyond Indian or non-Indian status, or including searches for 
evidence of crime, are not authorized on purely tribal authority 
in the case of non-Indians.180  
Applying this new rule, the court concluded the district court erred in 
dismissing Bressi’s § 1983 claim against the tribal officers.181 The seizure 
was not an exercise of tribal authority because the officers “did not confine 
themselves to inquiring whether or not [Bressi] was or was not an 
Indian.”182 “Once they departed from, or went beyond, the inquiry to 
establish that Bressi was not an Indian, they were acting under color of state 
law,” and so the United States Constitution applied.183 The court remanded 
                                                                                                                 
 176. Id. at 896.  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id.  
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. at 896–97.  
 181. See id. at 897–98. The court found that the district court did not err in dismissing 
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law. See id. at 898.  
 182. Id. at 897. 
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the case to the district court to determine whether the officers were entitled 
to qualified immunity.184  
Bressi’s special rule for roadblocks metastasized into a broad limit on 
tribal arrest authority whenever a non-Indian is on non-Indian land in 
United States v. Cooley.185 Cooley involved a routine traffic stop.186 While 
patrolling the reservation, a Crow Nation police officer checked on a truck 
idling on the side of the highway.187 The officer questioned the driver, 
Thomas Cooley, about his travel plans, during which he noticed two 
semiautomatic rifles in the front passenger seat.188 When Cooley began 
fishing around in his pockets, the officer drew his gun and ordered him out 
of the car.189 Before the stop was over, the officer recovered a handgun, 
glass pipe, and a bag containing methamphetamine.190  
In federal court, Cooley argued that the contraband were inadmissible 
because the tribal officer had no authority to seize him.191 The district court 
agreed.192 It recognized that “tribal police have the authority to investigate 
on-reservation violations of state and federal law by non-Indians” pursuant 
to the tribe’s right to exclude.193 But it then pivoted to Bressi, which it read 
as holding that “a tribal police officer commits an unreasonable seizure 
when he detains a non-Indian on a public right of way that crosses the 
reservation unless there is an apparent state or federal law violation.”194 
Although Bressi did not articulate what satisfies this “‘apparent’ standard,” 
the district court reasoned that, as a “carefully drawn exception borne of 
practical necessity,” it was “more stringent than particularized suspicion 
and probable cause.”195  
Reviewing the stop, the court first found—without explanation—that the 
officer “determined Cooley was non-Indian when Cooley initially rolled his 
window down.”196 It then recounted the facts the officer had accumulated 
                                                                                                                 
 184. See id. at 898.  
 185. 919 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir. 2019).  
 186. United States v. Cooley, No. CR 16-42-BLG-SPW, 2017 WL 499896, at *1 (D. 
Mont. Feb. 7, 2017), aff'd, 919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. at *2. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at *3–4. 
 192. Id. at *5. 
 193. Id. at *3. 
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 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at *4. 
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prior to drawing his gun: “bloodshot and watery eyes, no odor of alcohol, 
possible but unconfirmed slurred speech, two semi-automatic rifles, wads 
of cash in Cooley's pocket, and answers to questions that seemed untruthful 
to him.”197 None of this, “whether taken individually or cumulatively, 
establish[ed] an obvious state or federal law violation.”198 Accordingly, 
because the tribal officer “exceeded the scope of his authority when he 
detained Cooley,” the court suppressed the evidence as the fruits of an 
unreasonable seizure.199 
Although the Ninth Circuit quibbled with the district court’s reasoning, it 
affirmed.200 The panel first recounted the “nuanced” landscape of tribes’ 
authority to investigate and arrest non-Indians.201 Under Duro, “tribal 
officers can investigate crimes committed by non-Indians on tribal land and 
deliver non-Indians who have committed crimes to state or federal 
authorities.”202 But under Strate, tribes cannot exclude non-Indians from 
state or federal highways, and thus, under Bressi, tribes “also lack the 
ancillary power to investigate non-Indians who are using such public rights-
of-way.”203 Bressi, the court concluded, was not just about roadblocks. 
Rather, it “set[] forth general principles governing the scope of tribal 
officers’ authority to seize and question on a public right-of-way within an 
Indian reservation non-Indians and those whose Indian status is 
unknown.”204 Thus, just as Bressi created law from whole cloth, so too did 
Cooley: “Continuing to detain — and searching — a non-Indian without 
first attempting to ascertain his status is beyond authority of a tribal officer 
on a public, nontribal highway crossing a reservation.”205 
Expanding Bressi to traffic stops all but ensured Cooley would prevail. 
The tribal officer, the court observed, “never asked Cooley whether he was 
an Indian or otherwise ascertained that he was not.”206 Here, it rejected the 
district court’s conclusion that the officer determined Cooley was non-
Indian based on his looks.207 “Indian status is a political classification,” the 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Id.  
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 199. Id.  
 200. United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2019).  
 201. Id. at 1141. 
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court admonished.208 What the officer should have done, the court 
explained, was ask Cooley whether he was an Indian.209 Accordingly, the 
court ruled that the officer “exceed[ed] his legal authority as a Crow 
officer” because when he seized Cooley and searched his car “he had not 
asked Cooley whether he was an Indian.”210 
C. Clarifying Tribal Arrest Authority Through the Courts 
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Exclusion-based Theory Is Flawed  
Bressi and Cooley highlight the failure of the federal judiciary to 
coherently set forth rules governing tribes’ authority to investigate and 
arrest non-Indians. Problems—both doctrinal and practical—abound.  
On the merits, Bressi is wrong that “tribal officers have no inherent 
power to arrest and book non-Indian[s]” on public roads within the 
reservation because the “usual tribal power of exclusion of nonmembers 
does not apply there.”211 First, it improperly conflates tribal civil 
jurisdiction with tribal criminal jurisdiction. To support this rule, Bressi 
cited Strate, the case in which the Supreme Court held a tribal court could 
not hear a lawsuit involving an accident on a state highway because the 
road was non-Indian land and, under Montana, tribes generally lack civil 
jurisdiction over the conduct of non-Indians on non-Indian land.212 But the 
concerns motivating Montana do not apply to the criminal sphere. Montana 
holds that tribes’ semi-sovereign status means that tribes can regulate non-
Indians on non-Indian land only to the extent “necessary to protect tribal 
self-government or to control internal relations.”213 Circumscribing civil 
jurisdiction based on land status makes good sense because the exercise of 
civil jurisdiction—zoning ordinances or hunting regulations, for example—
is principally about regulating how land is used. And often the activities 
that a non-Indian conducts on his own land will “bear[] no clear 
relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations.”214 In contrast, 
criminal jurisdiction, by definition, implicates the sovereign’s dignity and 
the welfare of its members. Thus, there is always a “clear relationship” 
between a crime committed in Indian country and the tribe. It is therefore 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 1143. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 895–96 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 212. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997). 
 213. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). 
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deeply mistaken to look to Montana’s test for civil jurisdiction to define the 
boundaries of tribal criminal authority. 
Second, Bressi overlooked critical language in Strate that cuts against its 
rule. Specifically, the Supreme Court in Strate observed in a footnote that it 
did not “question the authority of tribal police to patrol roads within a 
reservation, including rights-of-way made part of a state highway, and to 
detain and turn over to state officers nonmembers stopped on the highway 
for conduct violating state law.”215 That the Supreme Court cited Schmuck 
for this proposition further undermines Bressi’s reliance on Strate. Finally, 
Bressi’s rule flies in the face of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), which makes clear that 
land status within a reservation is irrelevant for the question of Indian 
Country criminal jurisdiction. Indeed, the statute explicitly identifies 
“rights-of-way[s] running through the reservation” as Indian Country.216  
But even taking Bressi at face value, its rule is both unworkable and 
dangerous. It limits detentions occurring on non-Indian land to “the amount 
of time, and the nature of inquiry, that can establish whether or not 
[suspects] are Indians.”217 But trying to determine Indian status—which 
turns on Indian blood quantum and political recognition as an Indian—in 
the field is a fool’s errand. Regarding the first prong, there is no consensus 
on the minimum amount of Indian blood to qualify as an Indian. Some 
courts consider 1/8 Indian blood sufficient,218 while others require a higher 
blood quantum threshold.219 Being 14/64 Native American was good 
enough for one court,220 but another rejected 12/64.221 One state appellate 
court has even accepted 11/256—or just 4.29%—Indian blood as enough to 
satisfy the blood quantum requirement.222 Predicting the second prong, 
which turns on a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, is no easier.223 The 
                                                                                                                 
 215. Strate, 520 U.S. at 456 n.11 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 
1332, 1341 (Wash. 1993) (en banc)).  
 216. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2012).  
 217. Bressi, 575 F.3d at 896–97. 
 218. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1227 (9th Cir. 2005).  
 219. See, e.g., Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo. 1982) (concluding that 1/8 
blood quantum is not a “‘substantial amount of Indian blood’ to classify appellant as an 
Indian”). 
 220. United States v. Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 888 (D.S.D. 1991).  
 221. In re Gravais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1225 (E.D. Wash. 2004). 
 222. State v. Nobles, 818 S.E.2d 129, 136 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).  
 223. See, e.g., United States v. Loera, 190 F. Supp. 3d 873, 883–84 (D. Ariz. 2016) 
(finding that defendant failed the recognition prong despite attending tribal funerals and 
religious ceremonies, receiving tribal medical services, living on the reservation, and having 
a son who was an enrolled member). 
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district court’s conclusion in Cooley that the officer “determined Cooley 
was a non-Indian when Cooley initially rolled his window down” thus 
belies credulity.224 How could the officer calculate Cooley’s Indian blood 
quantum or evaluate his tribal contacts on the side of the road? For the court 
to make this finding, it had to assume something it dare not put in print: that 
Indianness is skin deep. While the Ninth Circuit repudiated this approach, 
its suggestion that the officer ask the suspect if they are Indian (and rely on 
the answer) is no better. Not only does this assume the suspect will answer 
truthfully, but a court could differ with the suspect’s self-assessment of 
their Indian identity. In making tribal police authority contingent on both 
Indian status and land status, Bressi requires a tribal police officer to 
navigate the criminal jurisdiction maze each time she performs a stop. 
Moreover, the rule limiting tribes to investigating non-Indians only for 
“obvious” or “apparent” violations is an ad hoc and vague standard. 
Consider the test’s application in Cooley. Once the officer “determined” 
Cooley was non-Indian, the officer lost his ability to detain Cooley unless it 
was “apparent” that Cooley was breaking the law. The district court found 
that when the officer drew his gun, he had observed “[Cooley’s] bloodshot 
and watery eyes, no odor of alcohol, possible but unconfirmed slurred 
speech, two semi-automatic rifles, wads of cash in Cooley’s pocket, and 
answers to questions that seemed untruthful to him.”225 According to the 
district court, these observations did not amount to an “obvious” violation 
of the law.226 But what does? The district court didn’t say, suggesting only 
that this standard is “notably higher than ‘probable cause.’”227 The Ninth 
Circuit steered clear of the question too.228 The lack of a meaningful 
standard is doubly cruel, as it both asks tribal police to hit a moving target 
while also empowering the courts to judge with the benefit of hindsight.  
More problematically, the Bressi standard is sharply at odds with the 
Fourth Amendment, which permits detentions so long as supported by 
“reasonable suspicion,” a standard that merely requires the officer to have 
“articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot’” at the time of the 
                                                                                                                 
 224. United States v. Cooley, CR-16-42-BLG-SPW, 2017 WL 499896, at *4 (D. Mont. 
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seizure.229 Indeed, under the facts of the case, a state or federal officer could 
unquestionably detain Cooley and search his car;230 a tribal officer, 
however, must let Cooley go as soon as it is determined that he is a non-
Indian. In setting such a high bar, Bressi subverts the crime-prevention 
function of tribal law enforcement, effectively shielding competent non-
Indian criminals from scrutiny in Indian Country.  
Worst of all, courts have not confined Bressi to its original subject 
matter. To its credit, Bressi specified that its rule was for “suspicionless 
stop[s] of non-Indians” because of the greater intrusion imposed by a 
roadblock on non-Indian motorists relative to a traffic stop.231 In Cooley, 
however, the Ninth Circuit transformed Bressi into a general prohibition 
against detaining non-Indians on public roads.232 If read for all its worth, 
Cooley thus creates a per se limit on tribal arrest authority that applies 
throughout the reservation, not just highways. As with state roads, tribes are 
presumed to lack civil jurisdiction, including the exclusion power, over 
non-Indians on fee land within the reservation.233 As a result of the General 
Allotment Act,234 countless reservations are a “checkerboard” of trust land 
                                                                                                                 
 229. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
30 (1968)); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (“Although an 
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 233. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557–65 (1981) (distinguishing tribes’ 
inherent authority to condition the entry of non-Indians on tribal lands from entry on non-
Indian lands, and holding the latter is circumscribed); see also South Dakota v. Bourland, 
508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993) (noting that under Montana, “when an Indian tribe conveys 
ownership of its tribal lands to non-Indians, it loses any former right of absolute and 
exclusive use and occupation of the conveyed lands”); Water Wheel Camp Recreational 
Area Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 808–12 (9th Cir. 2011) (canvassing Supreme Court 
case law distinguishing the extent of tribal jurisdiction over tribal land versus non-Indian 
land).  
 234. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, repealed by Indian Land Consolidation 
Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-462, 114 Stat. 1991. 
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and non-Indian fee land.235 As such, a broad reading of Bressi would 
diminish tribal police power throughout much of Indian Country, creating 
safe havens for criminals. At bottom, Bressi’s reasoning is deeply flawed 
and Cooley, an illegitimate extension of Bressi, highlights the harm of its 
rule. Because neither logic nor Supreme Court precedent compels this 
result, the Ninth Circuit’s approach should be discarded or, at a minimum, 
cabined to roadblocks as Bressi envisioned.  
2. Possible Jurisprudential Fixes 
There are two ways out of this chaos.236 First, courts could recognize that 
the tribe’s power to exclude, and hence its arrest authority, is independent 
of the tribe’s status as a property owner.237 Several sources support the 
conclusion that tribes’ exclusion power spans the reservation. For one thing, 
international law has long recognized the ability to control the flow of 
goods and persons across borders as a core aspect of sovereignty.238 Indeed, 
all three branches of the federal government have acknowledged that tribal 
sovereignty encompasses the right to exclude.239 Additionally, Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 235. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 648, 650 n.1 (2001) (noting that 
roughly ninety million acres of land within reservations was acquired by non-Indians 
pursuant to the General Allotment Act); Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah v. Myton, 835 F.3d 
1255, 1262 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[C]heckerboard jurisdiction is a fact of daily life throughout 
the West, the result of many different congressional commands . . . .”). See generally Judith 
V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing the effects of 
allotment on federal Indian law). 
 236. Admittedly a third approach exists—affirm tribal arrests in accordance with the 
plain language of Duro. This is what the Minnesota Court of Appeals did recently after 
trying to make sense of Bressi, Schmuck, and Terry. See State v. Thompson, 929 N.W.2d 21, 
32–34 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019).  
 237. See Jeremy Wood, Tribal Exclusion Authority: Its Sovereign Basis with 
Recommendations for Federal Support, 6 AM. INDIAN L.J. 197, 240–42 (2018), 
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1186&context=ailj. For 
an application of this approach, see United States v. Nichols, No. CR-14-30038-MAM, 2014 
WL 4185360 (D.S.D. Aug. 20, 2014).  
 238. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, WITH THREE EARLY 
ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY, bk. I, § 90, at 133 
(Bela Kapossy & Richard Whatmore ed., 2008) (1758) (“Every state has consequently a 
right to prohibit the entrance of foreign merchandises . . . .”).  
 239. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States and the Dwamish, Suquamish, and 
Other Allied and Subordinate Tribes of Indians in Washington Territory, Jan. 22. 1855, 12 
Stat 927 (setting aside land for Indian reservations and recognizing that “no[] . . . white man 
[would] be permitted to reside upon the same [land] without permission of the said tribes”); 
Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897) (acknowledging Chickasaw could withdraw citizenship 
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Court case law supports a broad exclusion power. In Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, the Court recognized the exclusion power as “a hallmark of 
Indian sovereignty.”240 To cabin this power to only that “possessed by any 
individual landowner or any social group,” the Merrion Court explained, 
would “denigrate[] Indian sovereignty.”241 Likewise, in Duro, the Court 
reaffirmed that tribes can expel “those who disturb public order on the 
reservation.”242 Its use of “reservation” rather than “tribal land” suggests 
that the power does not dissipate simply because the offender is standing on 
fee, rather than trust, land. Finally, Congress’s decision to treat all land 
within reservation boundaries as Indian Country reaffirms that property 
ownership does not constrain tribes’ ability to police their territory.  
In the alternative, federal courts could fully embrace Schmuck’s gesture 
to Montana,243 and uphold tribal arrest authority as an exercise of tribes’ 
regulatory power.244 While Montana voiced the “general proposition that 
the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the 
activities of nonmembers,” it created two exceptions.245 Tribes can assert 
jurisdiction over a non-Indian “who enter[s] consensual relationships with 
the tribe or its members” as well as a non-Indian whose “conduct threatens 
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or 
the health or welfare of the tribe.”246 Tribes have a compelling case that the 
power to arrest falls squarely within the second Montana exception. The 
epidemic of violence in Indian Country “directly” affects the health and 
wellbeing of tribal members and, by extension, the tribe.247 In the context of 
drunk driving, for example, “[a]llowing a known drunk driver to get back in 
his or her car, careen off down the road, and possibly kill or injure Indians 
                                                                                                                 
and banish naturalized members); Oscar L. Chapman, Assistant Sec’y, Opinion, 55 Interior 
Dec. 66 (Oct. 25, 1934) (including the authority to “remove or to exclude from the limits of 
the reservation nonmembers of the tribe” as an inherent power of tribes).  
 240. 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982). 
 241. Id. at 146. 
 242. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(2) (2012), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197–98 (2004). 
 243. See State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332, 1341 (Wash. 1993) (en banc). 
 244. See Wood, supra note 237, at 242–46 (discussing the relationship between the 
exclusion power and Montana generally).  
 245. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). 
 246. Id. at 566.  
 247. For a persuasive application of this argument, see Brief of Amici Curiae National 
Indigenous Women Resource Center Supporting Respondents at 17–29, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. 
Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496), 2015 WL 6467637.  
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or non-Indians would certainly be detrimental to the health or welfare of the 
Tribe.”248  
Unfortunately, both paths are a steep climb. The Court retreated from 
Merrion’s robust vision of the tribal power to exclude in Strate, 
characterizing a tribe’s power to exclude as a “land owner’s right” that 
depends on whether the tribe possesses a “gatekeeping right” over the 
property.249 It will be even more difficult to cram the square peg of tribal 
arrest authority into the round hole of Montana. For one thing, grounding 
tribal arrest authority in Montana entails mixing doctrinal apples and 
oranges, which, as Bressi illustrates, may generate more confusion than 
clarity. Moreover, the approach taken in Schmuck may no longer be viable, 
as the Supreme Court has narrowed the second Montana exception: The 
non-Indian’s activities “must do more than injure the tribe, it must ‘imperil 
the subsistence’ of the tribal community.”250 While violent conduct 
arguably satisfies that test, the Supreme Court has never upheld an exercise 
of tribal jurisdiction under this exception.  
In sum, most courts treat tribal arrest authority as an exercise of the 
tribes’ power to exclude. But because the exclusion power has subsequently 
been limited to a property right, the checkerboard character of Indian 
Country poses to transmogrify Duro’s simple rule into an unwieldy mess. 
Given the considerable obstacles to either expanding the exclusion power or 
finding a new doctrinal home for tribal arrest authority, stakeholders should 
look outside the courts for a solution.  
III. Existent but Flawed Solutions 
There are two approaches currently available to clarify tribal authority to 
arrest non-Indians: the common law doctrine of citizen’s arrest and 
cooperative agreements between tribal and non-tribal governments. Both, 
however, have serious drawbacks that preclude either from lifting the fog of 
uncertainty.   
                                                                                                                 
 248. State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332, 1341 (Wash. 1993) (en banc). 
 249. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997).  
 250. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341 
(2008) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)). 
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A. Citizen’s Arrest Law  
In an effort to portage the rough waters of Indian law, litigants251 and 
courts252 have sought to frame a tribal officer’s seizure of a non-Indian as a 
citizen’s arrest. That doctrine permits a private person to use force to 
apprehend and detain a wrongdoer under certain circumstances.253 The law 
varies dramatically from state to state.254 In particular, jurisdictions differ in 
what crimes trigger the arrest power and the quantum of probable cause a 
citizen must possess for a lawful arrest.255 A Californian, for example, 
would be remiss to attempt a citizen’s arrest while visiting Massachusetts. 
California allows citizen’s arrests for a handful of misdemeanors, in 
addition to felonies, and it allows arrests for felonies not committed in the 
citizen’s presence if she acts with “reasonable cause.”256 In contrast, a 
citizen’s arrest in Massachusetts is lawful only if the arrestee “in fact has 
committed a felony.”257 Without diving deeper into the nuances of citizen’s 
arrest law, the upshot is that the only arrest authorized by every jurisdiction 
is one in which the private person watches the arrestee commit a felony.258 
Despite the initial appeal of using this doctrine to escape jurisdictional 
headaches, the costs outweigh the upside. As an initial matter, relying on 
                                                                                                                 
 251. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 929 N.W.2d 21, 26 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (noting that 
the state argued tribal officer’s arrest of intoxicated non-Indian “is justified by the citizen’s-
arrest statute”); State v. Branham, 2004-NMCA-131, ¶ 17, 136 N.M. 579, 584, 102 P.3d 
646, 651 (rejecting state’s claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that tribal officer 
conducted a citizen’s arrest); Brief for Respondent at 15–20, State v. Ericksen, 259 P.3d 
1079 (Wash. 2011) (No. 80653-5), 2008 WL 6194060 (arguing that tribal officer’s arrest 
was valid as a citizen’s arrest).  
 252. See State v. Chavez, 96 P.3d 1093, 1095–97 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Kieffer-
Roden, 2009 OK CR 18, ¶¶ 10–12, 208 P.3d 471, 473–74 (holding tribal officer’s arrest of 
non-Indian for driving while intoxicated was a valid citizen’s arrest); State v. Davidson, 479 
N.W.2d 513, 515–16 (S.D. 1992) (per curiam); see also State v. Eriksen, 259 P.3d 1079, 
1084 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (Alexander, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court should 
affirm the defendant’s conviction on the ground that the tribal officer’s stop of a non-Indian 
motorist outside of the reservation was a lawful citizen’s arrest).  
 253. Arrest, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For an in-depth examination of 
the doctrine’s common law origins, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CITIZEN’S ARREST: THE LAW 
OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND PRIVATE POLICE 9–13 (1981). 
 254. See Ira P. Robbins, Vilifying the Vigilante: A Narrowed Scope of Citizen’s Arrest, 
25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557, 565–72 (2016), for a canvassing of state citizen’s arrest 
laws.  
 255. See id. at 573–77.  
 256. CAL. PEN. CODE § 837 (Deering, LEXIS through 2019 Sess.). 
 257. Commonwealth v. Lussier, 128 N.E.2d 569, 575 (Mass. 1955). 
 258. See Robbins, supra note 254, at 572.  
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citizen’s arrest law would significantly constrain the authority of tribal 
officers. A tribal officer in Massachusetts, for instance, would be unable to 
arrest drunk drivers because that is a misdemeanor offense.259 And even in 
jurisdictions like California, which permit misdemeanor arrests, that power 
is generally restricted to “breach[es] of peace,”260 an ill-defined category of 
offenses.261 Given these limitations, shackling tribal arrest authority to 
citizen’s arrest law would only perpetuate the notion that non-Indians are 
above the law in Indian Country. 
Treating tribal arrests as citizen’s arrests would also strip tribal police of 
both tribal and official immunities, potentially exposing them to tort 
liability in state court. Because a tribe’s sovereign immunity shields it from 
suit, a person injured by a tribal officer within Indian Country is generally 
limited to suing the officer in her individual capacity.262 Further, the 
plaintiff is usually limited to seeking relief in tribal court.263 In Williams v. 
                                                                                                                 
 259. Commonwealth v. Grise, 496 N.E.2d 162, 164–65 (Mass. 1986) (holding citizen’s 
arrest for DUI was unauthorized); accord Commonwealth v. Limone, 957 N.E.2d 225, 229 
(Mass. 2011).  
 260. For example, the citizen’s arrest laws of Arizona, Mississippi, Indiana, and Texas all 
contain this limitation. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3884 (LexisNexis 2018) (allowing a 
citizen’s arrest only for misdemeanor “amounting to a breach of peace”); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 99-3-7 (West 2018) (authorizing citizen’s arrest for an officer or private citizen for “a 
breach of the peace threatened or attempted in his presence”); IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-33-1-4 
(West 2018) (permitting an arrest for misdemeanors that are a breach of peace if “the arrest 
is necessary to prevent the continuance of the breach of peace”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 14.01(a) (2018) (specifying citizen’s arrest for crimes that are “against the public 
peace”).  
 261. Robbins, supra note 254, at 574–75. For instance, a Texas appellate court fractured 
over whether a drunk driver who repeatedly crossed the dividing line and bumped into the 
curb amounted to a “breach of peace.” See Kunkel v. State, 46 S.W.3d 328, 330–32 (Tex. 
App. 2001). 
 262. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“Indian tribes have 
long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally 
enjoyed by sovereign powers”); see also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 
788–89 (2014) (affirming the principle of tribal sovereign immunity); cf. Linneen v. Gila 
River Indian Cmty., 276 F.3d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of lawsuit 
against tribe and tribal officers stemming from an allegedly unlawful detention); Young v. 
Duenas, 262 P.3d 527, 529 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (dismissing wrongful death suit against 
tribe and tribal officers).  
 263. In the eyes of some, the absence of a non-tribal forum “means that [non-Indian] 
plaintiffs have no formal judicial remedy.” Lamere v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880, 
882 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). This view is deeply misguided. See, e.g., D’Ambra v. 
Maikshilo, No. GDTC-T-10-105-PMG, 2014 WL 8662640 (Mohegan Gaming Disputes 
Trial Ct. Apr. 28, 2014) (awarding arrestee over $32,000 in damages in excessive force 
action against tribal officer).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
198 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
 
 
Lee, the Supreme Court held that state courts lack jurisdiction over civil 
claims against member-Indians arising from on-reservation conduct.264 The 
door to federal court is likewise closed: the plaintiff cannot bring a Bivens 
or § 1983 action because tribal officers are not bound by the Constitution,265 
and ICRA only creates a cause of action for habeas relief.266 This generally 
holds true even if the tribal officer has been deputized to enforce state or 
federal law; that alone is insufficient to transform a tribal officer into a 
federal or state actor.267 And even if the officer is amenable to suit in a non-
tribal court—say because the officer was non-Indian or the alleged tort 
occurred outside the reservation—the Supreme Court has advised that tribal 
actors are entitled to qualified immunity.268 
Swapping Duro for citizen’s arrest law, however, would strip officers of 
these protections and delay the administration of justice. For one thing, 
citizen’s arrests are risky business; if the state’s law does not authorize the 
seizure, the arrestee can turn around and sue the arrestor for false 
imprisonment.269 And because a person effectuating a citizen’s arrests is, by 
definition, acting in her private capacity, a tribal police officer who arrests a 
non-Indian arguably would not be entitled to tribal immunity. Admittedly, 
these concerns may seem largely theoretical given that Williams requires 
                                                                                                                 
 264. 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); cf. Crawford v. Couture, 2016 MT 291, 385 Mont. 350, 
384 P.3d 1038 (holding state court lacked jurisdiction to hear non-Indian’s tort claims 
against tribal police officers stemming from on-reservation arrest).  
 265. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 56 (“As separate sovereigns pre-
existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those 
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”); cf. 
Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A]ctions under Section 1983 cannot 
be maintained in federal court for persons alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights 
under color of tribal law.”) (quoting Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1989)); 
Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000) (dismissing Bivens claim against 
tribe and tribal officers for want of subject matter jurisdiction); Boney v. Valline, 597 F. 
Supp. 2d 1167, 1186 (D. Nev. 2009) (same).  
 266. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71.  
 267. See Herbert v. United States, 438 F.3d 483, 484–85 (5th Cir. 2006) (tribal officer 
was not amenable to suit under the FTCA notwithstanding the officer holding a BIA 
commission); Trujillo v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1151 (D.N.M. 2003) (despite 
tribal-federal compact, tribal officers were not federal agents for purposes of the FTCA); 
accord Boney, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1172–81 (collecting cases). But see Evans, 869 F.2d at 
1347–49 (reversing dismissal of § 1983 claim against deputized tribal officers because 
plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded that their arrest was performed under color of state law). 
 268. See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1291–92 & 1285 n.2 (2017) (suggesting that 
tribal gaming employees sued in their individual capacity can raise personal immunity 
defenses).  
 269. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 253, at 60–62; Robbins, supra note 254, at 564, 573.  
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lawsuits against Indians for on-reservation conduct to be brought in tribal 
court, and those courts are not bound by state law. But the shield that 
Williams created is beginning to show cracks; at least one state court has 
asserted jurisdiction over tort claims involving Indian defendants for on-
reservation conduct because it occurred on non-tribal land.270 This raises the 
possibility that tribal police could be held to answer in state court for arrests 
which occur on fee land within the reservation. And in any event, 
shoehorning tribal arrests into this confusing common law doctrine will 
only further incentivize non-Indian defendants to challenge their 
prosecutions in state or federal court.  
Finally, beyond the practical concerns, reducing the authority of tribal 
law enforcement to that of a private citizen denigrates tribal sovereignty. 
Tribal police are a “reflection of tribal rights to shape and enforce their own 
laws” who convey “the intent of a tribal government to protect and serve its 
own citizens.”271 Accordingly, turning to citizen’s arrest law relegates tribal 
police to private security guards and tribes to private organizations—an 
analogy the Supreme Court has expressly rejected.272 Indeed, the Schmuck 
court refused to turn to citizen’s arrest law, precisely because this 
“conflict[ed] with Congress' well-established policy of promoting tribal 
self-government.”273 Given these many pitfalls, tribes have wisely refrained 
from arguing that their officers are merely active citizens. Instead, tribes 
have sought to cloak their officers in federal or state authority. 
B. Cooperative Agreements 
Given the confused state of the law, tribes have sought to strengthen their 
law enforcement authority by entering into cooperative agreements with 
                                                                                                                 
 270. See C’Hair v. Dist. Court of Ninth Judicial Dist., 2015 WY 116, ¶ 52, 357 P.3d 723, 
738 (Wyo. 2015) (holding it could exercise jurisdiction over personal injury suit against 
tribal member for on-reservation accident that occurred on a state highway because tribe has 
a “diminished regulatory interest on a state highway”). Another state court recently held 
Williams did not foreclose jurisdiction over a civil lawsuit brought by the state of California 
against an Indian for on-reservation business activities, reasoning the suit “d[id] not infringe 
tribal sovereignty” and the defendant’s conduct—selling cigarettes—extended beyond the 
reservation’s boundaries. People ex rel. Becerra v. Huber, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79, 86–90 (Ct. 
App. 2019).  
 271. EILEEN LUNA-FIREBAUGH, TRIBAL POLICING: ASSERTING SOVEREIGNTY, SEEKING 
JUSTICE 8 (2007). 
 272. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (“Indian tribes within ‘Indian 
country’ are a good deal more than ‘private, voluntary organizations’ . . . .”). 
 273. State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332, 1342 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).  
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local, state, and federal counterparts.274 Through a compact, non-tribal 
governments may agree to deputize tribal officers who meet certain training 
standards to enforce federal or state law on the reservation.275 When a state 
or county is a party, the agreement is often reciprocal, enshrining non-tribal 
police with the authority to police Indian Country.276  
Contracting can make Indian Country safer and promote tribal 
sovereignty.277 First, deputizing tribal officers serve as a potent antidote to 
jurisdictional paralysis by making clear that tribal law enforcement 
authority is not bound by the limits Oliphant places on tribal prosecutorial 
jurisdiction. Second, deputizing state officers can benefit tribal 
communities by increasing the number of police patrolling the 
reservation.278 Third, compacts encourage states and tribes to pool 
resources, share information, and pursue federal funding for joint efforts.279 
Finally, advocates tout cooperative agreements as a means to enhance tribal 
sovereignty.280 Besides empowering tribal law enforcement, these 
                                                                                                                 
 274. Joel H. Mack & Gwyn Goodson Timms, Cooperative Agreements: Government-to-
Government Relations to Foster Reservation Business Development, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1295, 
1298 (1993). The federal and state compacting processes differ greatly. On the federal side, 
the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) authorizes the BIA 
to contract with tribes to provide services on the reservation, including the enforcement of 
federal criminal law. See 25 U.S.C. § 5303 (2012). In contrast, state compacting varies by 
jurisdiction. Fourteen states grant authority to tribal police to act as state peace officers upon 
satisfying certain requirements; in the other eighteen states with Indian country this authority 
is at the discretion of local governments. See Matthew Lysakowski & Priya Sarathy Jones, 
Tribal Law Enforcement Authority to Enforce State Laws, 18 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 49, 55–
57 (2017). 
 275. See Lysakowski & Jones, supra note 274, at 57; see also Hannah Bobee et al., 
Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: The Solution of Cross Deputization 11–12 
(Indigenous Law & Policy Center, Working Paper No. 2008-01, 2008) (describing cross-
deputization agreements).  
 276. See Bobee et al., supra note 275, at 18–19 (noting that of the ten tribes in Michigan 
that have tribal police departments, nine have reciprocal deputization agreements with local 
agencies).  
 277. See id. at 22–24; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian 
Country, FED. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2006, at 38, 42–43; Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in 
Native American Law: Models for Expanded Usage, 112 HARV. L. REV. 922, 929–32 (1999) 
[hereinafter Intergovernmental Compacts]; Mack & Timms, supra note 274, at 1310–11. 
 278. See, e.g., Cross-deputization Helps Solve Jurisdictional Issues, supra note 110 
(describing how a cross-deputization agreement enabled the closest police officer to respond 
to a shooting on tribal lands).  
 279. Mack & Timms, supra note 274, at 1307.  
 280. Fletcher, supra note 277, at 42 (“[A]greements improve tribal sovereignty by 
allowing tribes to exercise a de facto form of sovereignty over checkerboarded lands.”); 
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agreements serve as an acknowledgement of tribes’ status as coequal 
sovereigns and reduce inter-governmental tensions through diplomatic, 
rather than legal, channels.  
Cooperative agreements, however, are no panacea. First, cross-
deputization agreements may simultaneously result in over— and under—
policing. On the one hand, they expose Indians to racial profiling and the 
heavy-handed tactics of non-tribal police forces who are frequently poorly 
trained and openly hostile to Native communities.281 On the other, non-
tribal authorities may give short shrift to crimes occurring in a jurisdiction 
not their own.282  
Second, deep-seated animosity and the vagaries of politics can make 
compacting a nonstarter or prompt one party to unilaterally suspend the 
agreement.283 Distrust on both sides of the aisle has been cited as the largest 
obstacle to forging deputization agreements.284 And even once the 
agreement is in place, it may not be durable. For example, in Schmuck, the 
court observed that the tribal officer who arrested the defendant was not 
deputized because Washington’s Kitsap County revoked its agreement with 
the Suquamish.285 More recently, California’s Humboldt County dissolved 
a cross-deputization agreement with the Hoopa Valley Tribe in 2015 after 
several months of fighting over funding and officer qualification 
standards.286 
Finally, the piecemeal implementation of these agreements may fail to 
strengthen tribal arrest authority. In many cases, deputization is often 
contingent on the tribal officer obtaining a commission from the non-tribal 
government, a costly and burdensome process.287 For example, before a 
                                                                                                                 
Mack & Timms, supra note 274, at 1310–11; Intergovernmental Compacts, supra note 277, 
at 929–31 (detailing how cooperative agreements reduce inter-governmental tension and 
empower Native communities without having to submit to costly and protracted litigation in 
the court of a competing sovereign).  
 281. BARBARA PERRY, POLICING RACE AND PLACE IN INDIAN COUNTRY: OVER- AND 
UNDERENFORCEMENT 47–59 (2009). 
 282. Id. at 61–72; see also Washburn, supra note 99, at 730–34.  
 283. LUNA-FIREBAUGH, supra note 271, at 44; MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 39. 
For example, efforts in Idaho and Wyoming to grant peace officer status to tribal police 
failed in 2011 and 2013, respectively. Lysakowski & Jones, supra note 274, at 57. 
 284. See Bobee et al., supra note 275, at 13–14; Fletcher, supra note 277, at 43.  
 285. State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332, 1344 n.1 (Wash. 1993) (en banc). 
 286. See Lee Romney, In Humboldt County, Tribe Pushes for Bigger Law Enforcement 
Role on Its Lands, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-
me-tribal-law-enforcement-20151020-story.html.  
 287. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 12.21(b) (2019) (“Tribal law enforcement officers operating 
under a BIA contract or compact are not automatically commissioned as Federal officers; 
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tribal officer can enforce federal law pursuant to a deputization agreement 
with the BIA, the officer must receive a Special Law Enforcement 
Commission (SLEC).288 This requires a FBI background check, meeting the 
state’s Peace Officer standards, and attending a firearms training.289 The 
SLEC expires every three years, after which the officer must reapply to the 
BIA and the tribe must re-certify the officer’s qualifications.290 Worse, the 
BIA often takes a year or more to process an application.291 The result is 
that, despite the tribe having entered into a cooperative agreement with the 
BIA, only a handful of officers may be able to enforce federal law.292 At 
bottom, while cooperative agreements can serve as a localized remedy, they 
cannot serve as a sweeping solution to solidify tribal law enforcement 
authority over non-Indians.  
IV. A Statutory Solution 
Congress has previously demonstrated a willingness to remedy law 
enforcement gaps in Indian Country through expanding tribal jurisdiction. It 
overturned Duro by amending ICRA to give tribes criminal jurisdiction 
over “all Indians.”293 And, more recently, it partially closed the Oliphant-
gap by giving tribes limited criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians under 
VAWA.294 Using these statutes as a template, Congress should pass 
legislation to recognize the power of tribal law enforcement to arrest non-
Indians in Indian Country for crimes committed therein. To be both legally 
sound and politically feasible, such a law should contain three features.  
First, Congress should explicitly recognize tribes’ authority to arrest non-
Indians as an exercise of tribal sovereignty, not a delegation of federal 
power. The distinction is critical. If arrest authority is a delegated 
                                                                                                                 
however, they may be commissioned on a case-by-case basis.”); Bobee et al., supra note 
275, at 23 (“For political reasons or general distrust, a sheriff may decline to deputize a tribal 
official. If a sheriff declines to deputize tribal officers, they have no authority to enforce 
state laws against non-Indians.”).  
 288. BIA Internal Law Enforcement Services Policies, 69 Fed. Reg. 6321 (Feb. 10, 
2004). 
 289. Id. at 6322. 
 290. Id. 
 291. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 35, at 103.  
 292. See Bobee et al., supra note 275, at 16 (detailing how “financial constraints or the 
personal characteristics of the [tribal officer]” make it “difficult or impossible” to obtain a 
commission). As of 2017, the BIA reported that 92 of 178 tribal law enforcement agencies 
have at least one officer who holds a SLEC. See Lysakowski & Jones, supra note 274, at 58.  
 293. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2012). 
 294. Id. § 1304(b)(4)(B).  
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congressional power, then when a tribal police officer arrests a non-Indian, 
she would be acting under color of federal law and, therefore, subject to the 
Constitution’s restraints. Conceptually, this would be a significant 
infringement on tribal sovereignty, as it would transform tribal police into 
federal officers whenever a non-Indian is arrested. On a more practical 
level, it would empower an arrestee to sue tribal officers in federal court 
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics,295 which creates an implied cause of action to remedy 
constitutional injuries inflicted by federal actors.296 Likewise, because the 
tribal officer would be a federal actor, the United States would be liable for 
the officer’s tortious conduct under the Federal Tort Claims Act.297 In 
contrast, if tribes’ arrest authority is simply an exercise of tribal inherent 
sovereignty, then the officer is acting under color of tribal law; they are 
subject to ICRA and liable only according to tribal law as interpreted by 
tribal courts.  
Congress should have no difficulty finding the right words for this task 
having done so twice before. First, to overturn Duro, Congress amended 
ICRA to “recognize[] and affirm[]” in each tribe “the inherent power” to 
prosecute nonmember Indians.298 When the Supreme Court reviewed this 
statutory fix in United States v. Lara,299 it took Congress “at its word,”300 
recognizing that it “d[id] not purport to delegate the Federal Government’s 
own federal power” but instead “enlarge[d] the tribes’ own ‘powers of self-
government.’”301 Second, Congress used almost identical language in 
VAWA, which “recognized and affirmed” that “the powers of self-
government of a participating tribe include the inherent power . . . to 
exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.”302 
                                                                                                                 
 295. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 296. Id. at 397.  
 297. The FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for intentional torts where 
the perpetrator is a federal law enforcement officer. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2012). An astute 
observer might point out that the Indian Self Determination Act allows recovery under the 
FTCA if the alleged injury was inflicted in furtherance of a self-determination contract. See 
25 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012). In practice, however, federal courts have consistently refused to 
find that tribal police were federal actors for the purposes of the FTCA. See Boney v. 
Valline, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1178–82 (D. Nev. 2009) (collecting cases).  
 298. See 25 U.S.C. 1301(2) (2012). 
 299. 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 300. Id. at 211 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 301. Id. at 198 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).  
 302. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(b)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29). 
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Congress should employ this same language to ensure courts treat tribal 
arrest authority as an exercise of tribes’ inherent sovereignty. 
Opponents may counter that Congress cannot alter the “metes and 
bounds of tribal autonomy.”303 Indeed, this question fractured the Court in 
Lara. There, it was asked to decide whether the federal prosecution of a 
nonmember Indian following a tribal prosecution violated the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, a question which turned on whether the Duro-fix was a 
delegation of federal power or a restoration of tribal sovereignty.304 Seven 
Justices concluded that the Duro-fix was best viewed as the latter, and 
therefore the federal prosecution did not implicate the Fifth Amendment.305 
But there was no consensus over whether Congress could tinker with the 
jurisdictional scheme. Five Justices thought ICRA’s “limited” alteration of 
tribal criminal jurisdiction was a valid exercise of Congress’ plenary power 
over Indian affairs.306 But four disagreed: Justice Kennedy questioned 
whether Congress could subject nonmembers to tribal courts,307 Justice 
Thomas argued Congress’ plenary power and tribal sovereignty were 
“schizophrenic,”308 and Justices Souter and Scalia contended the Duro-fix 
was a delegation of federal power because Congress could not reinvest 
tribal courts with jurisdiction that tribes previously surrendered.309 
There are, however, several reasons why this attack misses the mark 
when lodged against a statute clarifying tribal arrest authority. Most 
obviously, the law would not subject non-Indians to tribal prosecutorial 
jurisdiction. Non-Indians arrested by tribal police will still be turned over to 
non-tribal law enforcement, and non-tribal prosecutors will decide whether 
to pursue charges in non-tribal court in accordance with non-tribal law. For 
the same reason, the equal protection and due process concerns swirling 
around in Lara are inapposite.310 But more importantly, unlike the Duro-fix 
                                                                                                                 
 303. Lara, 541 U.S. at 205.  
 304. Id. at 199 (“We assume, as do the parties, that Lara's double jeopardy claim turns on 
the answer to the dual sovereignty question. What is the source of the power to punish 
nonmember Indian offenders, inherent tribal sovereignty or delegated federal authority?”) 
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 305. Id. at 210 (Breyer, J., majority opinion); id. at 211 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 216 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 306. Id. at 210. 
 307. Id. at 211–12 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 308. Id. at 219 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 309. Id. at 227–31 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 310. Id. at 205 (declining to consider Lara’s equal protection or due process arguments). 
Specifically, Lara argued that the Due Process Clause forbids Congress to authorize the 
prosecution of a nonmember Indian in a forum lacking the full panoply of criminal 
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or VAWA, this statute does not purport to alter the current scope of tribal 
sovereignty. Rather, it would merely codify and clarify Duro’s recognition 
that tribes can detain and expel non-Indians.  
Second, the statute should require that evidence obtained by tribal police 
comports with ICRA for it to be admissible in state or federal court. Critics 
of this law are likely to charge that tribal police, free from the constraints of 
the Constitution, will collect evidence against non-Indians in ways that 
would otherwise violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendment and then turn it 
over to state or federal prosecutors. While a fair concern, it can easily be 
put to rest with thoughtful drafting. 
To be sure, the fear that expanding tribal arrest authority will expose 
non-Indians to prosecutions based on illegally obtained evidence is not 
frivolous. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue directly, 
its decision in United States v. Bryant311 suggests that evidence obtained by 
tribal authorities is admissible in federal and state court even if the seizure 
would be unconstitutional had non-tribal police performed it. The defendant 
in Bryant attacked his conviction under a provision of VAWA, which 
makes it a federal crime to commit a domestic assault within Indian 
Country if the person has two or more prior domestic violence convictions, 
because his predicate offenses were uncounseled tribal court convictions.312 
Specifically, he argued that, because the prior convictions would have 
violated the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel had they been obtained in 
state or federal court, they could not be used to prove an element of the 
federal crime.313 The Court, however, had no trouble affirming his 
conviction: ICRA, not the Sixth Amendment, applied to tribal proceedings, 
and ICRA requires that a defendant receive counsel only if the term of 
imprisonment exceeds one year.314 Thus, Bryant supports the proposition 
that federal and state courts can consider tribally-obtained evidence 
irrespective of the Fourth Amendment.  
Moreover, as a general matter, the exclusionary rule does not apply to 
evidence collected by foreign officials because doing so would not serve 
                                                                                                                 
constitutional protections, id. at 207–08, and that the Duro-fix was an unjustified race-based 
distinction, id. at 209.  
 311. 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).  
 312. Id. at 1965–66 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012)).  
 313. Id. at 1958.  
 314. See id. at 1962, 1965–66. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI, with 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1302(c) (2012).  
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the deterrence purpose for which it was designed.315 That is, because the 
suppression of evidence in an American forum is unlikely to influence the 
conduct of foreign police, courts can admit evidence that concededly would 
be barred if obtained domestically. Given that tribes are separate 
sovereigns, this doctrine, and its reasoning, arguably applies to tribal police 
with equal force. And while the courts of appeal have recognized 
exceptions to this rule, they are exceedingly narrow, offering defendants 
scant protection.316  
But these concerns can easily be alleviated by requiring that tribally 
obtained evidence comport with ICRA to be admissible in federal or state 
court. ICRA imposes on tribal governments most of the provisions 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.317 And whereas the ICRA’s right to 
counsel differs from the Sixth Amendment (hence Bryant), ICRA contains 
provisions verbatim to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.318 Because of 
this, federal and state courts have held that ICRA imposes “identical 
limitation[s]” on tribal police as the Fourth and Fifth Amendment, 
including the exclusionary rule.319 People v. Ramirez is instructive.320 
There, tribal police saw the defendant sitting in his car and, “[w]ith little 
further ado,” searched it.321 The California Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court’s suppression of drugs recovered from the search, explaining that 
“by act of Congress, Indian tribal governments have no more power to 
conduct unreasonable searches and seizures than do the federal and state 
                                                                                                                 
 315. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976). Some have characterized this 
rule as an “international silver platter doctrine.” Michael P. Scharf, Tainted Provenance: 
When, If Ever, Should Torture Evidence Be Admissible?, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 129, 152 
(2008).  
 316. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 723 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2013) (recognizing 
suppression of foreign-obtained evidence is required if the foreign official’s conduct “shocks 
the conscience,” when the foreign official cooperated with American officers such that the 
foreign official was a “virtual agent” of the United States, or when foreign and American 
cooperation was done to circumvent the American officer’s constitutional obligations).  
 317. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a). 
 318. See id. § 1302(a)(2) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government 
shall . . . violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable search and seizures.”); id. § 1302(a)(4) (protecting the right 
against compelled testimony).  
 319. United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005); see People v. 
Ramirez, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 631, 635–41 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Madsen, 760 N.W.2d 
370, 374–77 (S.D. 2009).  
 320. Ramirez, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 631.  
 321. Id. at 635.  
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governments under the Fourth Amendment.”322 Although it acknowledged 
that ICRA contains no exclusionary rule, the court held that it did so 
implicitly, pointing out that when Congress enacted ICRA, the Supreme 
Court spoke of the rule as constitutionally mandated and that it benefits 
tribes by deterring tribal police from engaging in conduct that will hinder 
non-tribal prosecutions.323 Thus, Congress need not choose between 
supporting tribal arrest authority or the Bill of Rights. Rather, Congress can 
achieve both goals by including in the legislation that the admissibility of 
evidence in non-tribal courts is contingent on satisfying ICRA.  
Third, the statute should create a remedy for injuries inflicted by tribal 
police. As explained above in Part III.A, sovereign immunity shields the 
tribe from lawsuits, and tribal officers are generally only liable in tribal 
court for on-reservation tortious conduct.324 Yet, because this statute 
encourages tribal officers to engage with non-Indians, simple math 
indicates that it will increase the likelihood that non-Indians will be injured 
by tribal police. Congress should therefore include a federal cause of action 
against tribal officers in their individual capacity but also expressly extend 
to them the doctrine of qualified immunity.  
This approach sensibly balances the interests of the tribe, the non-Indian 
victim, and the tribal officer by putting tribal police on equal footing with 
their state and federal counterparts. Limiting the remedy to suing the officer 
in his or her individual capacity respects tribal sovereign immunity and 
treats tribes like the federal government and the states.325 Such a remedy 
also advances the interests of the non-Indian victim by giving them the 
option to pursue relief in a familiar forum. 
                                                                                                                 
 322. Id. at 637.  
 323. See id. at 638–40.  
 324. See supra Section III.A and notes 259–65.  
 325. The United States enjoys ironclad immunity from suit, and a waiver of this 
protection must be “‘unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text.” FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 
284, 290 (2012) (quoting Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)); see also United States v. 
Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882) (acknowledging it as “established law of this country” that 
“the United States cannot be lawfully sued without its consent in any case”). The FTCA is 
one such waiver, although it contains a number of significant limitations. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680 (2012). The act excludes from the waiver of immunity any claim “based upon the 
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function,” id. 
§ 2680(a), exempts from liability a slew of intentional torts such as assault, id. § 2680(h), 
and does not extend to constitutional violations, FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476–78 
(1994). As for the states, the Eleventh Amendment provides a broad shield against private 
suits. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019) (overturning 
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), to hold that states are immune from suit in the courts 
of other states); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  
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Moreover, this remedy levels the playing field among deputized tribal 
officers, non-deputized tribal officers, and non-tribal police. As it stands 
now, non-deputized tribal officers are reachable only in tribal court, where 
they may be able to assert tribal sovereignty. In contrast, deputized tribal 
officers can be subject to suit in federal court,326 and, if sued in their 
individual capacity, cannot avail themselves of the tribe’s immunity.327 Yet, 
there exists “no reason to give tribal officers broader sovereign immunity 
protections than state or federal officers given that tribal sovereign 
immunity is coextensive with other common law immunity principles.”328 
At the same time, tribal officers should not receive less protection than their 
non-tribal counterparts, who receive qualified immunity from suit.329 
Although the Supreme Court has suggested tribal officers receive such 
protections, the issue remains unsettled.330 Accordingly, Congress should 
make clear that tribal officers are entitled to the same qualified immunity 
defenses that cover non-tribal officers.  
Conclusion 
The lawsuit between the Bishop Paiute Tribe and Inyo County 
demonstrates how prosecutorial jurisdiction and law enforcement authority 
are all too often confused in Indian Country. And despite Duro’s 
recognition that tribes can detain non-Indians, the Court’s decision to yoke 
arrest authority to the exclusion power poses significant administrability 
                                                                                                                 
 326. Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2015) (observing tribal officer acting 
under color of state law can be subject to § 1983 claim); Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 897–
98 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding deputized tribal officers acted under color of state law when they 
cited the plaintiff for a violation of state law and thus were subject to suit under § 1983); 
Allender v. Scott, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1216–18 (D.N.M. 2005) (substituting the United 
States for tribal officer defendants under the FTCA after concluding the officers were federal 
employees because the arrest, carried out under state law, was performed in furtherance of 
the tribe’s ISDEAA contract). 
 327. See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1291–92 (2017) (holding tribal employee sued 
in their individual capacity for negligence in federal court is not shielded by tribe’s 
sovereign immunity).  
 328. Maxwell v. Cty. of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 329. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (establishing the two-part test 
for qualified immunity). Of course, whether the common law doctrine of qualified immunity 
is legally justified or normatively desirable is a different question. See generally William 
Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018). But its flaws do not 
justify selectively extending it to cover some officers but not others based on their uniform.  
 330. See Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1292 n.2 (suggesting tribal employee can raise personal 
immunity defenses).  
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problems for both police and courts. Tribal police do not have the luxury of 
navigating jurisdictional labyrinths at the crime scene; Native communities 
cannot afford it.  
Congress should eliminate this confusion by recognizing the inherent 
sovereignty of tribes to arrest all persons within their territory. Doing so 
will not raze a path through the jurisdictional maze, nor will it obviate the 
need for collaboration among tribal, state, and federal law enforcement. But 
it will empower tribal police and put an end to the perception that non-
Indians are above the law in Indian Country. The power to protect its 
members lies at the core of tribal sovereignty. In the criminal context, this, 
at minimum, encompasses the authority to investigate crimes and make 
arrests. 
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